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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Firms globalizing their operations have become a major feature of the world economy. 
Global firms, either exporters or multinational firms, rely more heavily on external 
finance compared to their domestic peers. Investigating the role of financial 
development on firm internationalization is an emerging topic in academic research. 
Moreover, the recent turmoil in the financial markets and simultaneous collapse in 
international trade and foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) demonstrate the 
significance and urgency of such a research. During the recent financial crisis, global 
FDI inflows fell by 14% in 2008 to $1,697 billion, from a record high of $1,979 billion 
in 2007 and  fell at an accelerated rate in 2009 (World Investment Report, 2009). 
Meanwhile, world trade experienced the largest decline in more than 70 years. The rate 
of trade growth slowed from 6.4 percent in 2007 to 2.1 percent in 2008 and underwent 
the 12.2 percent contraction in 2009 (WTO, 2010). How to facilitate firm 
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internationalization by developing domestic financial systems and thus better protecting 
firms from financial crisis is in the priority of policy makers’ agenda. This thesis, which 
is written when the financial crisis is going on, aims to contribute to such discussions. 
Financial development, as a part of economic development, is “accompanied by 
the ‘institutionalization of saving and investment’ that diversifies channels for the flow 
of loanable funds and multiplies varieties of financial claims.” (Gurley and Shaw, 1955). 
In this thesis, I investigate three different aspects of financial development in three 
individual chapters and examine the effect of financial development on FDI and export.   
In chapter 2, I study the benefit from financial system diversification in providing 
alternative sources of funding for firms, especially in the time when one financing 
market is enduring difficulties in funding supply. The availability of a wider array of 
financial instruments and multiple sources of finances provide a buffer against adversity 
and help to smooth firms’ financing and investment.  In chapter 3, I analyze the 
difference between bank finance and bond finance in collecting information and 
screening risks of investment projects and investigate how to reduce the volatility of 
FDI by structuring domestic financial system. Chapter 4 is a case study on the effect of 
Chinese financial system reform on its exporter survival, which focuses on the 
improved provision of funds as a result of financial development and examines the 
disproportional effect on regions and different types of firms due to prevailing 
distortional lending and heavy state intervention in allocation of financial resources.  
In my research, firm heterogeneity is a key characteristic in distinguishing the 
effect of financial development. In chapter 2, I show that facing the change of financial 
conditions, whether a firm gains or loses depends on its productivity. With the existence 
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of multiple financing sources, although the substitute financing helps stabilize 
investment, only a small fraction of firms with high productivities benefit. Take the 
substitution of bond finance for bank finance as an example. Facing severe bank credit 
contraction, firms resort to bond finance. The increased bond supply exacerbates the 
competition in bond market and pushes up the bond rate. As a result, those less 
productive firms cannot afford the rising financing cost and are forced to exit from 
production. In chapter 3, I illustrate that productivity is an important determinant for 
firm’s financing strategy. Firms varying in productivity differ in financing choices. 
Given the information advantage of banks over bondholders, less productive firms 
exploit bank finance to obtain funding as well as information to reduce uncertainty in 
foreign investment whereas more productive ones tap bond market for financing in 
order to save the intermediary cost.  In chapter 4, ownership is a new dimension of firm 
heterogeneity which is highly related to firms’ financing power in China where political 
connections and state intervention play important roles in allocating financial resources. 
I find that private exporters are most financially constrained and thus benefit most from 
financial development through better availability to financial resources and reduction of 
ownership bias in funding distribution.  
The specific research questions and main findings of the next three chapters are 
summarized as follows1: 
In chapter 2, based on a heterogeneous firm set-up, we model firms’ access to the 
internal capital market, bank finance as well as bond finance and investigate how firms’ 
adjustment among multiple sources of finance affects their performance in foreign 
                                                 
1 Chapter 2 and 3 are joint work with Jiarui Zhang from Department of Economics, University of Munich, 
and Chapter 4 is assisted by Ziliang Deng from Renmin University of China with data processing. 
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direct investment and the aggregate industry productivity. We find that when facing a 
bank credit shock (e.g. tighter bank lending), firms with different productivities react 
differently. Less productive firms exit from the foreign market due to a lack of funds 
while those more productive ones resort to bond finance to sustain their multinational 
status. The increased demand for bond finance as compensation for decreased bank 
finance by the surviving multinationals exacerbates the competition in the bond market 
and bids up the bond return rate, which triggers a Melitz-type selection effect through 
the bond market and brings aggregate industry gains. However, the divestment of those 
failing FDI firms and thus reduced bond financing demand mitigate this effect. 
Chapter 3 investigates how heterogeneous firms choose their lenders when they 
raise external finance to fund FDI and how the choice of the external financing affects 
FDI’s performance. We establish an asymmetric information model to analyze why 
some firms use private bank loans while others use public bond to finance foreign 
production. Compared to public bondholders, the banks are informed creditors about the 
hidden information on FDI risk. Borrowing from banks requires extra information cost 
but guarantees the success of FDI. We show that the firms who are more productive and 
thus more resistant against bad productivity shocks prefer bond finance whereas the less 
productive firms exploit bank finance as insurance. Moreover, firms’ financing choices 
also rely on the risk of FDI destinations. Firms investing in more risky countries tend to 
use bank finance whereas those investing in less risky locations employ bond finance. 
We also present some facts on outward FDI of OECD countries. We find that higher 
ratio of bond finance relative to bank finance is linked to lower risk of total FDI 
location portfolio, which is consistent with our model predictions. 
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Chapter 4 examines the impact of financial development on exporter survival in 
foreign market with Chinese firm level data over the period 1998-2008. We measure 
financial development using the size, lending efficiency, term structure of bank loans 
and the degree of state intervention in financial resource allocation respectively. We 
find that larger scale, higher efficiency of bank lending and less state intervention 
facilitate while the relative abundance of long term credit deteriorates exporter survival. 
These effects are more pronounced for private exporters. However, financial 
development has almost no effect on state-owned exporters. For foreign-invested 
exporters, the level of state intervention matters the most. We attribute this 
disproportional impact to the government’s direct participation in funding investment 
and the distortional lending of banks, which vary across regions and industries with 
different levels of presence of state-owned enterprises. 
In summary, this thesis provides theories and evidences to demonstrate the impact 
of financial development in facilitating firm internationalization, which helps the 
economists and policy makers to better understand the role and the mechanism of 
finance in influencing firm cross-border activities. Moreover, the variation of impact of 
financial development across firms derived in my research suggests the significance and 
necessity of designing layers of customized policies for heterogeneous firms.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Multiple Finances, Margins of FDI, 
and Aggregate Industry Productivity 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
An emerging body of literature documents the impact of financial development on 
facilitating firm internationalization. While its function through providing a larger scale 
of external finance and relaxing firms’ financial constraints is widely accepted, it is not 
clear whether the diversification of financial channels and access to alternative finance 
accompanied by financial development play a role. Attention was drawn to the 
significance of multiple sources of financing by Chairman Alan Greenspan after the 
1997–98 Asian financial crisis (Greenspan, 2000). He argued that the development of 
alternative financing channels helped to fill the funding gap and stabilize business 
financing, which are especially important when either banks or capital markets freeze 
up in a crisis. Following this argument and motivated by the observations of credit 
crunch and simultaneous drawdown in foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) in the 
recent financial crisis, we address the question of whether the availability of alternative 
financing sources could help reduce the size of the collapse and influence welfare.  
Multinational firms have better access to multiple sources of finance than their 
domestically oriented peers. Firstly, multinational firms are usually large and productive 
ones (Helpman et al., 2004; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). Thus, they have a better 
chance of accessing market finance other than bank borrowing (Cantillo and Wright, 
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2000). Moreover, some firms can gain additional financial support from business 
partners or from the government in the form of trade credit or special policy loans. 
Secondly, multinational firms have access to finance from different locations. They can 
obtain finance from their parent country, raise funds from their host country locally or in 
some cases explore lower-cost finance on a worldwide basis (Antras et al., 2009; Marin 
and Schnitzer, 2006). Meanwhile, the internal capital market among the parent company 
and its foreign affiliates plays an important role for multinational firms. The allocation 
of funds through the internal capital market extensively substitutes for external 
financing when the latter is costly (Desai et al., 2004). Finally, firms tend to keep a 
precautionary fund reserve to adapt to potential risks and uncertainty (Bates et al., 2009; 
Riddick and Whited, 2009), which is particularly the case for multinational firms 
considering the extra cost and higher risk in foreign operations.   
Basing on a heterogeneous firm set-up, we model firms’ access to the internal 
capital market, bank finance as well as bond finance and investigate how firms’ 
adjustment among multiple sources of finance affects their performance in foreign 
direct investment and the aggregate industry productivity. We find that given exogenous 
contraction in the supply of bank finance, firms with different productivities react 
differently. Some less productive firms exit from the foreign market due to less access 
to bank finance and the unaffordable high cost of bond finance as a result of tougher 
competition in the bond market. In comparison, some relatively more productive firms 
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can resort to bond finance as compensation for decreased bank finance to sustain their 
multinational status. The increased demand for bond finance as a substitute for bank 
finance by the surviving multinationals exacerbates the competition in the bond market 
and bids up the bond return rate, which triggers a Melitz-type selection effect through 
the bond market and brings aggregate industry productivity gains. However, the 
divestment of those failing FDI firms and thus their reduced bond financing demand 
mitigate this effect.  
The contribution of this research is threefold. Firstly, it complements the quickly 
growing literature on credit constraint and firm internationalization by firstly proposing 
the impact of alternative financing and differentiating firm responses to the worsening 
financial condition. Manova (2007) introduces credit constraint into Melitz’s (2003) 
research and argues that credit constraint restricts firms’ participation and performance 
in cross-border activity. Arndt et al. (2009), Berman and Hericourt (2008), Buch et al. 
(2009), Li and Yu (2009) and Muuls (2008) provide supportive evidence for this 
argument using firm-level data from different countries. We reproduce this result that 
bad credit conditions impede firms from engaging in FDI. Furthermore, we show that 
this effect could be mitigated with the existence of alternative financing and could vary 
across firms with different productivities. Compensation from bond finance and the 
reallocation of the available funds stabilize firm financing and facilitate FDI. However, 
only the most productive firms are able to take advantage of multiple sources of finance 
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in smoothing foreign investment.  
Secondly, this chapter contributes to the work on financial systems by analyzing 
the complementary and substitution effects of bank finance and bond finance. Precisely, 
we find that more productive firms use more alternative finance as substitution to 
reduce the risk of credit shortage and risk of investment; hence the failure rate of firms’ 
FDI is endogenized in our model. The less productive firms, on the contrary, being 
unable to afford more expensive alternative finance, will choose to exit FDI market 
facing credit crunch; hence we also observe complementary effects. In existing 
literature, Datta et al. (1999) and Diamond (1991) document the complement of bank 
finance to bond finance by monitoring. Davis and Mayer (1991) show that the bank and 
bond markets can be alternatives to each other but they are not perfect substitutes. 
Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) focus on the role of bank finance in providing a back-up 
source and liquidity insurance for bond finance against market shocks. The 
complementary and substitution effects coexist in our model, which vary across firms. 
Although the substitution of multiple sources of finance could reduce the sensitivity of 
FDI to adverse shocks, only a fraction of more productive firms benefit from it. The 
complementary effect of bond finance on bank finance for those less productive firms 
implies that bond finance cannot fully substitute for bank finance when the banking 
sector faces a crisis. In our model, it is the higher cost of bond finance over bank 
finance that hinders less productive firms from employing alternative financing, thus 
 - 9 -
leading to the limited substitutability between the two sources. Our result suggests the 
importance of reducing the cost of bond finance and developing multi-layers of the 
financial system to satisfy the financing demand of various firms, especially those 
lower-quality firms.  
Thirdly, we propose FDI-induced aggregate productivity gains for the parent 
country through the selection effect in the capital market. Although the question of 
whether FDI benefits its host country in productivity through technology spillover to 
local firms is widely discussed (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Bitzer and Görg, 2005; 
Haskel et al., 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2003), the impact of FDI on the 
parent country is rarely considered. Compared with Pottelsberghel and Lichtenberg 
(2001), who present evidence that a country gains from outward FDI through 
technology sourcing, we show that FDI could bring aggregate productivity gains for the 
parent country through the reallocation of financial resources towards more productive 
firms. The tougher competition in the bond market induced by the large FDI financing 
demand selects the least productive firms out of production and enhances the aggregate 
productivity. However, this effect is dampened due to firms’ adjustment among multiple 
sources of finance.    
This chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 starts with the model in a closed 
economy as a benchmark case. After that, we introduce multiple sources of finance in an 
open economy setting, allowing firms to go abroad where the interaction of bank 
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finance and bond finance and its impact on the margins of FDI are investigated. Section 
2.3 characterizes the general equilibrium and discusses the aggregate outcome on 
industry productivity. Section 2.4 concludes. 
 
2.2  The Model 
 
Consider a world with two countries. We call one country the home (domestic) 
country and the other the host (foreign) country for FDI. There is a continuum of firms, 
indexed by i, producing differentiated varieties in each country. 
Firm i is born with initial internal fund Ni, which is a random number from a 
common distribution Γ( Ni). After paying an entry cost of fe (fe<Ni )., the firm draws 
productivity ϕi from a common distribution g(ϕ) (Melitz, 2003). With the knowledge of 
its own productivity, the firm makes the investing decision among three potential 
options: (1) purchasing corporate bonds BBi; (2) investing in domestic production, i.e. 
producing and selling a distinct product ω in the home country, the output being denoted 
by qiD; (3) engaging in FDI, i.e. producing and selling ω in the host country, the output 
being denoted by qiF. Note that the subscript D denotes variables for domestic 
production whereas F denotes those for foreign production; these apply to the whole 
chapter. 
There is a perfect bond market in the economy in which firms can either buy or 
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issue bonds, BBi being positive or negative accordingly. Upon a draw of very low 
productivity, producing is not as profitable as buying bonds. The firm therefore invests 
all its internal funds in bond holdings to achieve a safe return. Upon a draw of high 
productivity, on the contrary, the firm will produce. If its internal fund is not enough to 
pay the production cost, the firm will raise the working capital by issuing corporate 
bonds through bond markets.  
There is no fixed cost for the firm to invest in the bond market. In contrast, if the 
firm engages in production, regardless of whether it is domestic production or FDI, it 
must pay a fixed overhead cost f to set up the factory. In addition, there is an extra fixed 
cost CF for FDI. f and CF are measured in labor units. 
 
2.2.1 Closed Economy 
This subsection provides the closed economy case as a benchmark in which firms 
only serve the domestic market and obtain external finance merely by issuing corporate 
bonds. 
 
2.2.1.1 Demand 
The utility function of a representative consumer is  
          ( ) 1
1 −
Ω∈
−
⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡= ∫
ε
ε
ω
ε
ε
ωω dqU  
where the set Ω represents the mass of available varieties and ε denotes the elasticity of 
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substitution between any two varieties. Defining the aggregate good Q≡U with the 
aggregate price 
          ( )[ ] ε
ω
ε ωω −
Ω∈
−∫= 1
1
1 dpP  
and solving the expenditure minimization problem of the consumer, we have the 
demand function for every variety ω. 
( ) ( ) Qp
Pq
ε
ω
ω ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=                       (2.1) 
 
2.2.1.2 Production 
Each firm i produces a distinct variety ω and its output for the domestic market is 
denoted as qiD. Labor is the only input. Define the cost function for producing qiD as:  
f
q
l
i
iD
iD += ϕ
                       (2.2) 
where f>0 is the fixed cost for production, which is the same for any single firm. ϕi is 
the firm-specific productivity. The domestic nominal wage is denoted as wD. Assume 
that labor must be prepaid. 
 
2.2.1.3 Bond Market 
Assume that the bond market is perfect in the sense that it is competitive and there 
is no information asymmetry, and the equilibrium bond rate is r. Firms can invest their 
internal funds in buying a bond and achieve a return rate of 1+r. In comparison, firms 
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for which the domestic production is confined by limited internal funds can also issue 
bonds at the rate of 1+r. In the general equilibrium setting, the bond return rate r is 
determined by the condition that there is no aggregate net demand for bonds. For a 
single firm, however, r is given.  
 
2.2.1.4 Firms’ Optimal Decision 
In a closed economy, firm i allocates its own disposable internal fund after entry 
cost is paid between bond holding BBi and domestic production qiD (if it produces) and 
maximizes the total profit from the investment portfolio. Firm i solves 
iiD Bp ,
max     iiDDiDiDiD rBlwqp +−=π  
s.t.   eiiiDD fNBlw −≤+ ; (2.1); (2.2) 
where piD is the product price in the home country. We have: 
( rwp
i
D
iD +−
= 1
1 ϕε
ε )                          (2.3) 
( )
( ) Qrw
P
q
D
i
iD
ε
ε
ϕε
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
−
=
1
1                          (2.4) 
( )
( ) fQrw
Pl
D
iiD +⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
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+
−
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ε
ε
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εϕ
1
11                       (2.5) 
Bond holdings BBi can be calculated from the budget constraint.  
( )
( ) ⎪⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
+⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
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−
−−= − fQ
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ε
ε
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11                (2.6) 
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Proposition 2.1 (composition of pricing under limited internal funds): Both the 
financing cost (bond rate r) and the labor cost (wage rate wD over firm-specific 
productivity ϕi) compose the product price. Other things being equal, the higher r, 
higher wD or lower ϕi, the higher the product price and the lower the output.  
 
In our setting, the derived price piD consists of three parts: labor cost wD/ϕi, markup 
ε/(ε−1) and an additional part 1+r, where 1+r reflects the extra external financing cost. 
If a firm does not have sufficient internal funds for production, it issues a bond with a 
cost of 1+r to raise working capital. Therefore, the limited internal fund set-up results in 
a higher price and lower output compared to traditional set-up (e.g., Melitz 2003). To 
focus on the discussion on productivity in this chapter, we do not model firm 
heterogeneity in terms of internal fund N, though the effect of N on firm financing and 
production works through aggregation. If all the firms have more internal funds (N 
increases), they will issue fewer (or hold more) bonds, hence the bond demand increases 
relative to the supply and the bond return rate r declines. Other things being equal, the 
decreased financing cost results in a lower price and the supply of each variety will 
increase. 
 
2.2.1.5 Cutoff Productivity for Domestic Production 
As in Melitz (2003), a firm’s profit from domestic production depends on its 
 - 15 -
productivity. The less productive the firm is, the less profit it earns from production. 
Therefore, only those firms with productivities above a certain threshold will produce 
because of the existence of outside option. In our model, safe return rate from bond 
market is the outside option, and firms compare the profits from production and those 
from investing all their internal funds in purchasing bonds and choose to produce if and 
only if the former is greater than the latter; therefore, the cutoff productivity for 
domestic production ϕ*iD is determined by equation (2.7) below: 
           ( )eiiiDDiDiD fNrrBlwqp −=+−                 (2.7) 
 
Using (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) and the binding budget constraint, we have 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1
*
1
11 −
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⎬
⎫
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−
+−
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εεϕ
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rw
Q
f D
iD                  (2.8) 
 
Proposition 2.2 (cutoff productivity for domestic production): The cutoff productivity 
for domestic production ϕ*iD is higher with a higher fixed production cost f, higher 
labor wage wD or higher financing cost r. 
 
f and wD measure the real cost while r measures the financial cost of production. 
Intuitively, proposition 2.2 says that higher cost requires higher productivity for firms to 
be able to produce. The shapes of the increasing relationships depend on elasticity of 
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substitution ε. For example, when ε is less than 2, the cutoff productivity is convex in f, 
while when ε is larger than 2, it is concave in f. As for the impact of the firm’s internal 
fund, it only works through the bond market in aggregation. As we discussed in 
proposition 2.1, firms’ bond holding increases with their internal funds. More aggregate 
internal funds could pull down the bond rate and result in a lower cutoff productivity. 
However, in partial equilibrium, the bond rate is exogenous for a single firm. Therefore, 
the internal fund is not directly related to the firm-level cutoff productivity.  
 
2.2.2 Open Economy 
In this subsection, we consider the case of an open economy in the sense that firms 
are interested in producing domestically as well as expanding production to a foreign 
country by means of FDI. Meanwhile, we introduce going-abroad-oriented bank credit 
as alternative financing and reconsider the above firm’s investment portfolio decision. 
The cutoff productivity for a firm to become a multinational is also derived. Moreover, 
the interaction of borrowing from a bank and issuing corporate bonds and the overall 
effect of multiple sources of finance are discussed.  
 
2.2.2.1 Demand 
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume the aggregate price index 
and aggregate goods index in the host country are the same as those in the home country, 
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and are denoted again as P and Q, respectively. We impose further the assumption that 
when the economy shifts from autarky to openness, P and Q will not change. In other 
words, the new varieties coming in as the result of openness will not affect the 
aggregate indices. The demand function for each variety in the host country is given by: 
Q
p
Pq
iF
iF
ε
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=                            (2.9) 
 
2.2.2.2 Production 
Assume firm i’s productivity spills over to its foreign affiliate and it produces in 
the foreign country with the same productivity as in the home country but it has to 
shoulder an extra fixed cost CF to carry out FDI. This foreign expansion-induced fixed 
cost includes the expenses for building up foreign affiliates and distribution channels, 
collecting information about the foreign market and foreign regulations, etc. Regardless 
of the form of such a cost, it is independent of the firm’s output and must be paid before 
the firm’s revenue in the foreign market is generated. This cost CF is assumed to be 
uncertain for the firm at the moment when a firm arranges its investment portfolio. The 
distribution of CF is common knowledge and the FDI decision is made based on firm’s 
expectation for CF. CF is revealed when the firm sets foot on the foreign land. FDI is 
successful (hence FDI profit is received) only if CF is fully covered. 
In an open economy, the domestic production function is the same as equation 
(2.2), whereas the production function for FDI is given as: 
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F
i
iF
iF Cf
q
l ++=
ϕ
                        (2.10) 
where qiF and liF are respectively output and labor input in the foreign country. Here 
assume that the extra fixed cost CF follows a concave distribution f(CF) with support    
[0, ∞]. The f(CF) has the cumulative distribution F(CF).   
 
2.2.2.3 Going-Abroad-Oriented Loans and Probability of FDI Success 
To cover CF, the firm can obtain finance from banks. Assume that a going-abroad- 
oriented bank loan is available for all FDI firms. Such loans aim to release firms’ 
financial constraints due to the substantial upfront costs of FDI and are therefore 
assumed to be used only to shoulder CF.1 Collateral is required by banks. Firm i pledges 
a fraction τ,   τ∈(0,1], of the overhead fixed cost f as collateral to obtain a bank loan 
of the amount of μτf, where μ is the multiplier over the collateral. Here we use μ to 
measure the availability of external bank credit, which is an indicator of 
country-specific financial development. The higher μ implies better access to bank 
credit and better financial development of a country. For simplicity, we further assume 
that borrowing from banks is costless as bankers are competitive and have no access to 
the bond market.  
Moreover, to guarantee the sufficiency of funds to cover CF and thus the success of 
                                                        
1 By this assumption, we rule out the case that firms use this loan to pay for domestic production so that 
we can obtain results in an open economy that are comparable to those in a closed economy and focus on 
the effect of the bank loan on firms’ financing strategy and FDI decisions. 
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FDI, firms may keep some reserve funds A besides the bank borrowing μτf to pay the 
extra fixed cost. A could be a fraction of the internal fund or financed from the bond 
market. Therefore, before CF is revealed, the firm has A+μτf prepared. Hence, the 
probability of the FDI’s success is Prob(CF ≤ A+μτf)=F(A+μτf), which is endogenous 
decision of firms. As we shall see, for FDI firms, the more productive the firm is, the 
larger A is kept and the more likely that the FDI will be successful. Our model thus is 
related to the observation that productive multinational firms issue corporate bonds to 
raise capital for FDI since the profits from FDI are sufficiently large and they have 
higher incentive to guarantee the success. 
 
2.2.2.4 Firms’ Optimal Decision 
Firm i maximizes the expected total profit from bond holding, domestic production 
and FDI. 
iiiFiD BApp ,,,
max  ( ) ( ) iiiFFiFiFiDDiDiDi rBfAFlwqplwqpE ++−+−= μτπ ][  
s.t.  ( ) eiiiFiFFiDD fNBAClwlw −≤++−+ ; (2.1); (2.2); (2.9); (2.10); 
Note that the profit from FDI is multiplied by the probability of its success. Also 
note that in the budget constraint, CF is covered by A and μτf. Denoting the expected 
value of CF as C, we have: 
( rwp
i
D
iD +−
= 1
1 ϕε
ε )                        (2.11) 
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                     (2.12) 
( ) iiFFiDDeii AClwlwfNB −−−−−=                    (2.13) 
and Ai is determined by: 
( ) ( ) rfAflwqp iiFFiFiF =+− μτ                       (2.14) 
Equations (2.11)–(2.14) characterize the optimal choices of an FDI firm. We can 
compare the prices in the home country and the host country by comparing (2.11) and 
(2.12), noticing that F(A+μτf)≤1. 
The price for the domestic market has the same expression as that in the closed 
economy benchmark (equation (2.3) in section 2.2.1.4), which means that firms do not 
change their pricing strategy for the home market when they start foreign business. 
Nevertheless, the actual nominal value of the domestic price may be different. When the 
economy shifts from autarky to openness, firms of high productivity adjust their 
investment portfolios: purchase fewer bonds (or issue more bonds) and allocate funds to 
FDI. The adjustment, as will be discussed in aggregation in section 2.3, induces a 
tougher competition in the bond market and drives the bond return rate up. Hence, the 
actual price in the home market under an open economy setting will be higher than in a 
closed economy, although they share the same mathematical expression.  
As the reserve fund A is endogenously determined by firms, the probability of 
successful FDI is also endogenized. Hence we have a look at what affects the choice of 
the reserve fund. An implicit solution of A is given by equation (2.14). The simulation 
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results are provided in Appendix 2.1 (where propositions 2.3 to 2.6 are also simulated). 
We have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2.3 (reserve fund for FDI): Given that a firm maintains FDI, its reserve 
fund for FDI Ai is higher with higher productivity ϕi, lower credit access μ, lower 
production fixed cost f or lower bond financing cost r.  
 
The relationship between A and μ suggests a firm’s substitution in multiple sources 
of finance. When bank credit is tighter, a firm increases Ai as the alternative source to 
cover CF, so that it can maintain FDI. This finding supplements the existing literature in 
which firms are left helpless but exit production when bank credit is tight (Buch et al., 
2009; Manova, 2007). In our model, however, firms can resort to alternative finance and 
keep production unaffected.  
Note that borrowing from a bank has no cost but Ai has a cost of (1+r), because Ai 
is raised either from internal funds or from the bond market. If the bond return rate is 
higher, it is more attractive to buy bonds rather than producing, hence the firm will cut 
Ai.  
As for the negative relationship between fixed cost f and A, it works in two ways. 
On one hand, f is a real cost of FDI. The higher the cost is, the less incentive there is for 
firms to undertake FDI, and hence the smaller the reserve fund firms keep for FDI 
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projects. On the other hand, f could be used as collateral: firms can obtain greater bank 
loans against a larger f, so they could reduce the amount of the reserve fund. 
An important finding is that more productive firms keep more reserve funds and 
thus have a higher probability of success in producing abroad. As FDI is more profitable 
with higher productivity, those firms have incentives to guarantee the FDI’s success. 
This result differs from the previous literature, in which the probability of success or the 
probability of firms’ default is assumed to be exogenous and independent of firm 
productivity (e.g. Buch et al., 2009; Manova, 2007). In Li and Yu (2009), more 
productive firms have a higher probability of success but such a relationship is ex ante 
given without a micro foundation. In our model, however, the probability is 
firm-specific and firms themselves choose how much to “invest” to increase the 
probability of success. 
 
Proposition 2.4 (intensive margin of FDI): The more productive a firm is (higher ϕi), 
the larger is its affiliate sale. The sale is also larger if the wage cost wF is lower or the 
bond financing cost r is lower. If a firm can maintain FDI after a credit crunch2 
(decrease in credit multiplier μ), it raises working capital from issuing bonds and keeps 
its affiliate sale unaffected. 
 
                                                        
2 We will discuss the condition for firms to maintain FDI in section 2.2.2.5.  
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The first three arguments on ϕi, wF and r are intuitive and easily verified through 
equation (2.12). Higher productivity or a lower cost, either the wage cost or the 
financial cost, results in more output and sales. However, the change in bank credit 
availability μ triggers firms’ adjustment to their financing strategy and affects affiliate 
sales indirectly. In partial equilibrium, when bank credit suddenly becomes tight, firms 
raise more funds from the bond market to substitute for bank credit in order to keep 
their working capital. In our model, when μ decreases such that borrowings from banks 
are less, and if a firm can maintain FDI, it will increase A (proposition 2.3) to keep the 
probability of the FDI’s success. Therefore, according to equation (2.12), as long as the 
bond return rate does not change in partial equilibrium, the affiliate sale qiF will not be 
affected. This result is consistent with the evidence that during the recent financial crisis, 
a non-negligible fraction of firms reallocate more funds to finance working capital and 
their sales remain unchanged or even expand, especially in domestic-oriented or 
non-tradable sectors (World Bank Financial Crisis Survey 2010; 2010 Survey on 
Current Conditions and Intention of Outbound Investment by Chinese Enterprises). 
 
2.2.2.5 Cutoff Productivity for FDI 
To see how productive should a firm be profitable to do FDI, we calculate the 
cutoff productivity for FDI by equation (2.15), the LHS of which is the profit when the 
firm engages in domestic production as well as FDI while the RHS is the profit when 
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the firm merely serves the domestic market. The firm will expand production to the 
foreign country if and only if its total profit is higher than that from only serving the 
domestic market.  
( ) ( ) iDiDDiDiDiFiFFiFiFiDDiDiD rBlwqprBfAFlwqplwqp +−=++−+− μτ   
 (2.15) 
BBiF comes from (2.13) and BiDB  comes from (2.6). Then we derive the expression of 
cutoff productivity for FDI: 
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( ) ( )
1
1
* /1
1
/11 −
⎪⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
+
+⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
+−
=
εε
ε
εεϕ
frF
wrAFC
P
Frw
Q
f FF
iF              (2.16) 
where F denotes F(A+μτf). 
 
Proposition 2.5 (extensive margin of FDI): The cutoff productivity for FDI ϕ*iF is 
lower when firms face better access to credit (higher credit multiplier μ), lower bond 
financing cost r, lower production fixed cost f or C, and lower labor wage wF. The 
expected profit of undertaking FDI is larger with a higher μ.  
 
With the support of better availability of bank credit, more firms are able to go 
abroad. Meanwhile, the induced higher expected profits make FDI more attractive to 
firms. This result implies that better credit conditions as a result of the financial 
development in a country play a positive role in facilitating firm internationalization. On 
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the contrary, various costs, such as the labor wage, overhead cost and financial cost, 
impede firms from going abroad. 
Moreover, we have a look at the difference between the cutoff productivity for FDI 
and that for domestic production in order to investigate the question whether FDI firms 
are necessarily more productive than domestic firms. We have the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2.6 (cutoff gap): The gap between the cutoff productivity for FDI and the 
cutoff for domestic production (ϕ*iF −ϕ*iD) is lower facing lower bond rate r, larger 
credit multiplier μ and lower expected fixed cost C. 
 
Comparing equation (2.16) with equation (2.8), and knowing that F(A+μτf)≤1, we 
immediately conclude that ϕ*iF>ϕ*iD. Due to the existence of extra fixed costs, firms 
require higher productivity to attain positive profits from FDI. The two cutoffs are equal 
if and only if C = 0. In this case, the probability of a successful FDI is 1 and firms will 
not keep any A as it is not necessary and A is costly. Proposition 2.6 states that a better 
credit condition (higher μ) or lower bond financing cost (lower r) can reduce the 
productivity requirement for FDI and promote domestic firms’ growth into 
multinationals. Note that when facing a lower bond return rate r, both cutoffs decrease, 
while that for FDI declines faster, indicating the higher sensitivity of FDI to financing 
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conditions compared with domestic production.  
 
2.2.2.6 Complementarity and Substitution of Multiple Sources of Finance 
FDI firms have access to two external sources of finance, i.e. borrowing from 
banks and issuing corporate bonds. When facing a bank credit shock, firms adjust their 
financing strategy and fund allocation among investment projects but firms with 
different productivities react differently. Take a bad credit shock as an example.   
When bank credit suddenly becomes tight, i.e. μ suddenly decreases, then ϕ*iF 
increases (proposition 2.5) and hence some relatively less productive FDI firms are 
forced to exit. As a result of withdrawing capital from FDI, these firms issue fewer 
bonds. In this case, deteriorative bank credit results in shrinking bond issuance, which 
we call the complementary effect of bond issuing and bank borrowing. 
In contrast, however, those firms that are productive enough to maintain FDI under 
a worse credit condition issue more bonds as a substitution for reduced bank credit and 
keep the working capital for foreign production unchanged (proposition 2.3 and 2.4), 
which we call the substitution effect of bond issuing and bank borrowing. For the 
existence of the possibility to issue bonds as an alternative form of finance, firms do not 
necessarily experience production contraction when facing credit tightness, which 
implies the significance of multiple sources of finance in smoothing investment.  
Figure 2.1 depicts intuitively the change in A with decreased μ (from μ to μ’) and 
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the differentiation of firms in financing. As we mentioned above, only those firms with 
productivities that are higher than the cutoff productivity for FDI keep reserve fund A. 
The more productive the firm is, the more A it raises (proposition 2.3). Therefore, A is 0 
for the firms with productivities lower than ϕ*iF (μ), and A jumps to positive at the 
cutoff value ϕ*iF (μ) and keeps increasing with ϕ after that.  
 
ϕ 
A 
ϕ*iF (μ) ϕ*iF (μ’) 
μ’<μ 
Complementary: failing 
firms do not hold A  Substitution:  surviving 
firms hold more A   
0 
 
Figure 2.1 Complementary effect and substitution effect 
 
Facing a bank credit shock (μ decreases to μ’ ), the cutoff of carrying out FDI 
increases from ϕ*iF(μ) to ϕ*iF(μ’). The firms with productivities in between exit from 
FDI and hence do not reserve A anymore, while those firms with productivity higher 
than ϕ*iF(μ’) maintain FDI and raise more A from issuing bonds. As the adjustment of A 
responding to the alteration of the bank credit condition is through bond finance, Figure 
2.1 shows the complementary and substitution effect of bond finance and bank finance.  
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2.3  Aggregation  
 
2.3.1 Characterization of Equilibrium in an Open Economy 
In an open economy, stationary general equilibrium is characterized as follows: (1) 
there is an aggregate cutoff productivity for domestic production , which is 
determined by equalizing the profit from purely holding bonds and that from producing 
domestically; (2) there is an aggregate cutoff productivity for FDI , which is 
determined by equalizing the total profit from engaging in domestic production as well 
as FDI with that from merely domestic production; (3) a mass 
*
Dϕ
*
Fϕ
M of incumbent firms is 
partitioned into three groups in terms of productivity. Firms with productivity higher 
than  produce domestically as well as abroad. Firms with productivity lower than 
 do not produce but invest in purchasing bonds. Firms with productivity in between 
produce and serve the domestic market; (4) a firm’s entry decision is made by 
equalizing the present value of the expected average profit flows 
*
Fϕ
*
Dϕ
π  of all types of 
firms and the sunk cost for entry ; (5) in each period, a mass ef eM  of new entrants 
replaces the mass of Mδ  of incumbent firms that exit, where δ  is the probability of 
being hit by the “forced-exit” shock; (6) product markets clear such that the consumers’ 
demand is met by the firms’ supply; (7) the labor market clears to determine the wage w 
(we assume the inelastic supply of labor L); (8) the bond market clears in the sense that 
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there is no aggregate net demand for bonds, where the bond rate r is determined; (9) the 
resource constraint is satisfied such that the total income equals the total expenditure. 
The derivation of the general equilibrium is given in Appendix 2.2. 
 
2.3.2 The Complementary Effect and Substitution Effect Revisited 
As we discussed above, when an adverse shock on bank credit occurs, the comple- 
mentary effect implies that firms divest from FDI and purchase more bonds, whereas 
the substitution effect means that firms issue more bonds to finance FDI. In general 
equilibrium, the complementary effect and substitution effect influence the equilibrium 
in the bond market and thus the bond rate oppositely. The overall outcome is a result of 
the relative scale of the two effects, which further relies on the distribution of firm 
productivity and the severity of shocks on bank credit.  
In a country where the firm distribution skews towards high productivity, facing 
the same contractionary bank credit shock, more firms will sustain FDI and the 
substitution effect will be dominant. As a result, the bond rate will increase, and vice 
versa.  
Moreover, when facing a more severe adverse shock, more firms exit from FDI and 
transfer internal fund to purchase bonds. On the other hand, the survivors in FDI will 
issue more bonds to compensate for the reduced bank finance. Consequently, both the 
complementary effect and the substitution effect are stronger and the overall effect is 
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ambiguous.  
 
2.3.3 Selection Effect in the Bond Market and Aggregate Industry Productivity 
When an economy opens, those productive firms that go abroad will issue more 
bonds from the parent country to finance foreign production. The increased demand in 
the bond market will bid up the bond return rate and thus increase the financing cost for 
all the producing firms, either FDI or non-FDI firms. Facing a higher financing cost, the 
least productive producing firms are forced to exit from production and become bond 
holders. Thus, the aggregate productivity of producing firms increases. Therefore, 
outward FDI triggers the selection effect through the bond market and brings aggregate 
industry productivity gains for the parent country. 
As was previously discussed in Section 2.3.2, a shock to the bank credit supply can 
also influence the bond return rate and hence further the aggregate productivity gains. 
However, whether the change in bank credit conditions will intensify or weaken such 
gains relies on the relative importance of the above complementary effect and 
substitution effect. As a response to an adverse shock to bank finance, the rising bond 
rate as a result of the substitution effect will shuffle the deck and wash out less 
productive firms. However, the existence of the complementary effect pulls down the 
bond rate and mitigates this selection.  
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2.4  Conclusion  
 
This chapter introduces the internal fund, bank finance and bond finance into a 
heterogeneous firm set-up and analyzes firms’ adjustment among multiple sources of 
finance and its impact on the performance of FDI and the aggregate industry 
productivity. We show that with access to the bond market as an alternative source of 
financing, firms suffering from bank lending tightness could stabilize their financing 
and maintain FDI. However, only the more productive firms benefit from the 
substitution of bond finance for bank finance. In comparison, the less efficient firms 
could not afford the higher cost of bond finance due to the increased competition in the 
bond market when economy opens, and thus exit from production. Therefore, the rising 
bond rate induces the reallocation of financial resources from less efficient firms 
towards more efficient ones and thus increases the aggregate industry productivity of 
the producing firms. Nevertheless, the decreased financing demand of divesting firms 
helps to pull down the bond rate and thus weakens the above effect. 
Our results suggest the importance of the diversification of financial channels and 
significance of the availability of alternative financing in smoothing foreign direct 
investment, which is particularly important for low-quality firms. Moreover, the 
selection through the bond market implies the role of the capital market in reshuffling 
firms, which also proposes a mechanism of FDI-induced welfare change for parent 
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countries. 
To focus on the role of alternative financing in stabilizing investment, we did not 
discuss the difference between bank finance and bond finance in this chapter. However, 
modeling their differences in restructuring, monitoring and screening will help us to 
understand better the limited substitutability of the two sources of finance and might 
generate more fruitful results. Moreover, modeling the financing sources of bank sectors 
and investigating the co-movement of the bank sector and the bond market constitute 
another direction for future research. In addition, relaxing the perfect competition 
assumption for the bond market and introducing a firm-specific bond rate are also 
interesting extensions. This is what I do in the next chapter of the thesis. 
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Appendix 2.1  
Numerical Simulations of the Propositions 
 
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 are straightforward, so here we only provide the 
simulation results for propositions 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6.  
 
Distribution of the fixed cost for FDI: Assume CF follows Pareto distribution   
( ) ( )
k
F x
bxCxF ⎟
⎠
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⎛−=≤= 1Pr                   (A.2.1) 
with the support of [b,∞], where b and k are parameters of the distribution. The 
probability density function of CF is therefore given by 
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Denote the mean of CF as c, then ( )
1−
==
k
kbCEc F . 
 
A.2.1.1 Simulation of Proposition 2.3 
The optimal reserve fund A for an FDI firm is given by equation (2.14): 
( ) ( ) rfAflwqp iiFFiFiF =+− μτ  
By inserting equations (2.9), (2.10), (2.12), (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) into equation (2.14) we 
obtain equation A.2.3 for the simulation. 
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Figures A.2.1.1–A.2.1.4 depict the change in A with μ, r, f and ϕ, respectively.  
Parameter values 
Figure A.2.1.1: , 05.0=r 5.0=iϕ , 10=f , 2=ε , 1=Fw , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.2.1.2: 4.1=μ , 5.0=iϕ , 10=f , 2=ε , 1=Fw , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.2.1.3: , 05.0=r 4.1=μ , 5.0=iϕ , 2=ε , 1=Fw , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.2.1.4: , 05.0=r 4.1=μ , 10=f , 2=ε , 1=Fw , 10=P , , 10=Q 5.0=τ , 
, . 3== kb 5.4=c
 
Fig. A.2.1.1 
 
Fig. A.2.1.2 
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Fig. A.2.1.3 
 
Fig. A.2.1.4 
 
A.2.1.2 Simulation of Proposition 2.4 
We derive the solution for  (A.2.4) by inserting equation (2.12) and the 
distribution of  into equation (2.9), where variable A is determined by equation 
(A.2.3).  
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Figures A.2.2.1–A.2.2.4 show the change in  with r, wiFq F, ϕ and μ, respectively. 
Parameter values 
Figure A.2.2.1: 4.1=μ , 5.0=iϕ , 1=Fw , 2=ε , 10=f , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.2.2.2: , 05.0=r 4.1=μ , 5.0=iϕ , 2=ε , 10=f , 10=P , , 10=Q
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5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.2.2.3: , 05.0=r 4.1=μ , 1=Fw , 2=ε , 10=f , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.2.2.4: , 05.0=r 5.0=iϕ , 1=Fw , 2=ε , 10=f , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
 
Fig. A.2.2.1 
 
Fig. A.2.2.2 
 
Fig. A.2.2.3 
 
Fig. A.2.2.4 
 
A.2.1.3 Simulation of Proposition 2.5 
Inserting 
k
fA
bF ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
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+
−=
μτ
1  into equation (2.16), we obtain equation (A.2.5) for 
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simulation relating to . Variable A in equation (A.2.5) is determined by equation 
(A.2.3) in which 
∗
iFϕ
iϕ  takes the value of . Hence the result is the solution to the 
simultaneous equations (A.2.3) and (A.2.5). 
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The total profit of FDI firms is  
( ) ( ) iiiFFiFiFiDDiDiDi rBfAFlwqplwqp ++−+−= μτπ        (A.2.6). 
Inserting the optimal solutions of firms’ profit maximization problem given by 
equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) into (A.2.6) and rearranging, 
we obtain the final simulation equation for π . 
( ) ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
+⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
−
+−⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
−
= −
−−
fQPrwwrQPrw i
i
D
D
i
D
i
1
1
1
1
11
1
ϕ
ϕε
ε
ϕε
επ ε
ε
ε
ε
 
 - 38 -
( )
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−
+
−
+−+−+
−
k
k
i
F
Fe fA
bQP
fA
b
rwAcwfNr
μτ
μτ
ϕε
ε ε
ε
1
1
1
1
1
 
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
++
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−
+
−⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+
−− −
−
cfQP
fA
b
rwwr
fA
b
ik
i
F
F
k
1
1
1
1
1 ϕ
μτ
ϕε
ε
μτ
ε
ε
 
(A.2.7) 
Variable A in equation (A.2.7) is determined by equation (A.2.3). 
Figures A.2.3.1–A.2.3.4 show the change of  with μ, r, f and , respectively. 
Figure A.2.3.5 depicts the increasing relationship of 
∗
iFϕ Fw
π  with μ. 
Parameter values 
Figure A.3.1: , , 05.0=r 10=f 1=Fw , 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.3.2: 4.1=μ , , 10=f 1=Fw , 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , , 10=Q 5.0=τ , 
, . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.3.3: , 05.0=r 4.1=μ , 1=Fw , 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.3.4: , , 05.0=r 10=f 4.1=μ , 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , , 10=Q
5.0=τ , , . 3== kb 5.4=c
Figure A.3.5: , , 05.0=r 10=f 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , 10=Q , 5.0=τ , 
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3== kb , , , 5.4=c 1== FD ww 10=ef , 500=N . 
 
 
Fig. A.2.3.1 
 
Fig. A.2.3.2 
 
Fig. A.2.3.3 
 
Fig. A.2.3.4 
 
A.2.1.4 Simulation of Proposition 2.6 
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Fig. A.2.3.5 
 
Fig. A.2.4.1 
 
Fig. A.2.4.2 
 
Fig. A.2.4.3 
 
The simulation equation for  is derived by equation (A.2.5) minus equation 
(2.8). Figures A.2.4.1–A.2.4.3 describe the change in the cutoff gap  with r, μ 
and c, respectively. Note that given k, the relationship of  and c is indirectly 
represented by the change in  with b. 
∗∗ − iDiF ϕϕ
∗∗ − iDiF ϕϕ
∗∗ − iDiF ϕϕ
∗∗ − iDiF ϕϕ
Parameter values 
Figure A.4.1: 4.1=μ , , 10=f 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , 10=Q , 5.0=τ , 
, , . 3== kb 5.4=c 1== FD ww
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Figure A.4.2: , , 05.0=r 10=f 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , 10=Q , 5.0=τ , 
, , . 3== kb 5.4=c 1== FD ww
Figure A.4.3: , 05.0=r 4.1=μ , 2=ε , 5.0=iϕ , 10=P , 10=Q , 5.0=τ , 
3=k , .1== FD ww
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Appendix 2.2  
Sketch of the General Equilibrium in an Open Economy 
 
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that there is an unlimited number of 
prospective firms waiting to enter our model. Each firm was born with an initial fund N. 
To enter, they first have to pay entry cost fe with their initial fund to draw their own 
productivities from a common distribution g(ϕ). g(ϕ) is Pareto distribution with 
cumulative density function G(ϕ) and the support of [b,∞] (Helpman et al., 2004). Firms 
with high productivity produce, among which the higher ones also engage in FDI, while 
those with low productivity hold bonds only. All the firms face a constant probability δ 
of forced exit in each period. The forced exit firms can pay fe to draw new productivity 
again.  
Denotations of endogenous variables: M number of incumbent firms;  
number of new entrants in each period; 
eM
π average profit across all types of firms;  
cutoff productivity for domestic production;  cutoff productivity for FDI; 
∗
Dϕ
∗
Fϕ P  price 
index;  aggregate goods;  wage; and Q w r  bond rate. 
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the following equations. 
Zero cutoff profit for domestic production:   
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Zero cutoff profit for FDI:  
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Expected average profit:  
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where DDDDD rBwlqp +−=π , ( ) ( ) FFFFDDDF rBfAFwlqpwlqp ++−+−= μτπ  
Free entry condition:  
ef=δ
π                                (A.2.11) 
Firm entry equals firm exit:  
 MM e δ=                              (A.2.12) 
Labor market clearing condition: 
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(A.2.13) 
where L is the exogenous total supply of the economy, and labor demands for domestic 
production and FDI are given by: 
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Bond market clearing condition: 
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where  and DeD wlfNB −−= ( ) AclwwlfNB FDeF −−−−−=  
Price index: 
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(A.2.15) 
Resource constraint:  
( ) wLPQMfN ee =+−                     (A.2.16) 
We thus have 9 equilibrium conditions as well as 9 unknowns. 
In equation (A.2.8)–(A.2.16),  
( ) ( )( ) ( )∗−= DFD GG
gu
ϕϕ
ϕϕ *  if  and 
∗≥ Dϕϕ ( ) 0=ϕu  if . ∗< Dϕϕ
( ) ( )( )∗−= FF G
gu
ϕ
ϕϕ
1
 if  and ∗≥ Fϕϕ ( ) 0=ϕFu  if . ∗< Fϕϕ
( )
k
bG ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−=
ϕ
ϕ 1  
( )
k
bkg ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=
ϕϕ
ϕ  
and A is an implicit function of ϕ , which is determined by equation (2.14): 
( ) ( ) rfAflwqp iiFFiFiF =+− μτ . 
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Chapter 3 
 
Financial Structure, Productivity and Risk of FDI 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Risk is an important element in the theory of capital structure. Firms have incentives to 
reduce the costs associated with various risks by adjusting their capital structure (Desai 
et al. 2008). Meanwhile, risk is a key driving force for the volatility of investments and 
returns, which is particularly the case for FDI comparing to domestic investment. When 
comparing the FDI performances in countries with different financial systems, we find 
that outward FDI flows from countries with the market-based financial system like U.S. 
and U.K. are more volatile than those from countries with bank-based financial system 
like Germany and Japan (see Figure 3.1). Hence in this chapter, we investigate the 
question that facing business risks in foreign direct investment, how multinational firms 
choose their sources of financing and whether financial structure influences the 
volatility of foreign direct investment. Answering this question will illuminate the 
potential link of financial system and volatility of FDI, and further provide policy 
implications about how to structure the financial system to stabilize FDI and assist 
firms’ internationalization. 
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Figure 3. 1  Financial Structure and Volatility of Outward FDI 
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Note: This graph shows the annual outward FDI flow (deviations from trend) of Japan, United Kingdom, 
United States and Germany over 1990-2009. Standard deviation: Japan 18.7; United Kingdom 72.1; 
United States 68.6; and Germany 35.8. The data is in billions of US dollars at current prices and current 
exchange rates. Data source: UNCTAD. 
 
In this chapter, we develop a partial equilibrium model based on information 
asymmetry. The hidden information is the productivity shock, which happens when 
firms engage in FDI. A firm enters the model with a given amount of initial wealth as 
internal fund and draws its productivity. After knowing its own productivity, the firm 
makes two decisions, one is on whether investing abroad or not and the other is on the 
mean of financing if it does invest. There are two types of external finance: borrowing 
from bank or issuing corporate bonds from a group of bondholders.  
The productivity shock of FDI is ex ante unknown to all the parties (either banks, 
bondholders or firms) and it is only freely observable by the firm ex post. However, 
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banks are willing to spend some resources to monitor the risk and convey the 
information to the borrowing firms after they pay an information acquisition fee (Fiore 
and Uhlig 2005). The role of banks as delegated monitors is also assumed by Diamond 
(1984), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). The underlining motivation for banks to actively 
participate in monitoring the investment is their private relationships with lenders. The 
bondholders, in contrast, have no incentive to do so since the risk is shared by each 
individual holder.  
If the firm borrows from a bank, it can acquire the information about the potential 
shocks before making production decision. If the bank tells that a good shock will 
happen, the firm will engage in FDI and get positive profit. While if a bad shock is 
coming such that FDI is not profitable, the firm has the option to abstain from FDI trial. 
Thus, when firms choose bank financing, they pay an extra fee to protect themselves 
from the risk of productivity shock. In contrast, if the firm uses bond financing, it saves 
the information acquisition fee but expose itself to the risk. When facing a good shock, 
the firm gets positive net profit from FDI abstracting a fixed repayment to bondholders. 
However, it could happen that the firm is not able to repay the bondholders when 
suffering from a bad shock. In this case, the firm defaults and gets nothing whereas the 
bondholders completely seize all the generated revenues in the hands of the firm.  
The first result the model delivers is firms’ partition in financing in terms of 
productivity. Those firms trying to carry out FDI but with relatively low productivities 
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use bank finance to reveal the information on productivity shock ex ante and reduce the 
cost associated with potential risks, which is similar to purchasing insurance. In 
comparison, those firms with high productivities and thus able to resist against bad 
productivity shocks prefer to skip the costly middleman and issue bond directly.  
Secondly, the variance of productivity shocks (the indicator of risks) also impacts 
firms’ financing choices. Firms investing in low-risk host countries prefer bond finance 
since in this case the insurance from banks is not worthwhile. By contrast, firms who 
engage in FDI in more risky locations are more likely to use bank finance. This result 
links the financial structure of FDI sourcing country with the characteristics of its host 
countries as well as the volatility of its FDI flows. Higher ratio of bond finance relative 
to bank finance is associated with safer and less volatile foreign investment.  
Thirdly, the relative cost of bank finance and bond finance matters for firms’ 
financing decision. Intuitively, firms are inclined to use relatively cheaper finance. 
Moreover, decreasing the cost helps reduce the productivity threshold of FDI and 
product price in foreign market as a result of reduced financial cost.  
This chapter contributes to the rare research on the impact of financial 
development on FDI. What distinguishes us is the investigation on the structure effect of 
financial development. Besides reproducing the results that reduction of financing cost 
facilitates FDI as discussed in existing literatures, we set up a link between financial 
structure and FDI locations as well as volatilities based on the fact that foreign 
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investment faces significant risks and firms have incentive to reduce such risks by 
choosing different financing instruments. By doing so, we suggest a new direction of 
policy on reforming the structure of financial systems to promote firms’ 
internationalization. 
It also contributes to a huge body of capital structure literature in the following two 
aspects: first, we use productivity as a reference to segment firms in the choice of 
financing. We argue that productivity, besides leverage, size or cash flow focused in 
previous literatures, could be a key indicator for firm’s profitability and default 
probability, and affect its financing choices. Second, we incorporate product market into 
a financial structure model. Instead of calculating return of investment as in prior 
studies, we derive firms’ pricing and the revenues generated in product market such that 
the impact of financing on the intensive margin of FDI is discussed. In addition, we 
introduce the continuous stochastic states to calculate the cutoff productivities and 
derive the aggregation results for the whole economy. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 derives the 
model and firm-level predictions. Section 3.3 derives the aggregation results and 
discusses the relationships between financial structure, productivity and FDI risks. 
Section 3.4 provides some facts and evidences. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 The Model 
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Consider a world with two countries, one home country and one potential host 
country for FDI.1 We focus on the behavior of firms from home country. 
A continuum of firms is born with internal fund n, and they are heterogeneous in 
terms of productivityϕ1. Following Melitz (2003), we assume that firm i draws its 
idiosyncratic productivity ϕ1i from a common distribution G(ϕ1). After the productivity 
is revealed, the firm decides whether to engage in FDI or not. If it does not invest in 
foreign country, the firm can invest all its funds in a safe asset to get gross return of Rn 
where R is the exogenous safe return rate in the economy. Instead, if the firm decides to 
carry out FDI, it faces a productivity shock ϕ2, which brings uncertainty for the FDI 
revenue. The property of the shock will be specified in details when we introduce 
production. 
Assume that labor is the only input in production, which must be prepaid. Also 
assume that firms’ internal funds are not enough to fully finance the production, hence 
they need to borrow.  
There are two types of external creditors: one is banks and the other is a group of 
bondholders. Both of them have access to the safe return R, but they differ in the 
following aspects: 
                                                   
1 When we look at the data later in section 3.4, particularly when we examine the relationship between 
financial structure and average risk of FDI per destination country, we extend the model to multiple host 
countries setting. 
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As the delegated monitor of investors (Diamond, 1984), banks are willing to 
collect information on investment projects of their borrowers. In our model, we assume 
that banks spend resources to acquire information about the productivity shock ϕ2. Then 
conditional on the information obtained, banks offer firms the option to get loans and do 
FDI or abstain from FDI and keep their initial wealth. However, the reduced uncertainty 
comes at a cost, namely that an information acquisition fee is paid by firms to banks, 
which is assumed to be a share of the internal fund: τn. 
In comparison, the bondholders also offer the firms options to obtain funds, but 
there is no ex ante information acquisition about the risk of FDI. This assumption can be 
justified by the idea that there might be free-riding problems among bondholders since 
the risk is shared. As a consequence, bond finance saves the intermediary cost but it is a 
more risky choice because in a situation of financial distress (a very low ϕ2 is realized), 
firms will be fully liquidized by bondholders and completely lose their initial wealth.  
Intuitively, firms that have bad draws of initial productivities earn no more profit in 
FDI with either type of external finance than the safe return, and these firms 
immediately choose no FDI option. Firms with intermediate productivities go to banks 
and spend some initial wealth to “buy security” as they are more likely to suffer from 
financial distress even under the same risk. Those most productive firms would rather 
skip the costly middleman and issue finance from bondholders directly. The structure is 
summarized in Figure 3.2: 
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3.2.1 Demand 
The utility function of a representative household in host country is: 
11 −
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where the set Ω denotes the mass of available varieties and ε denotes the elasticity of 
substitution between any two varieties. Defining the aggregate good Q≡U with 
aggregate price 
[ ] εε −
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−∫= 1
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1
i iF
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and solving the expenditure minimization problem of the consumer, we have the 
demand function for every variety i: 
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3.2.2 Production 
Each firm i produces a distinct variety in FDI, and labor is the only input. The cost 
function is given as: 
 f
q
l
i
iF
iF +=
21ϕϕ
                        (3.2) 
where liF is the labor input, qiF output and f the fixed cost for production (measured in 
units of labor). The labor wage is normalized to 1. 
ϕ2 is the productivity shock coming from a distribution F(ϕ2). F has a non-negative 
support and without loss of generality, we assume E[ϕ2]=1. Following Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)’s proof for the interior solution, we also require that the 
hazard rate of F(ϕ2) is non decreasing in ϕ2: 
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The mean of F(ϕ2) is 1 and the variance is (1/3)C2. This variance, indicated by 
parameter C, is the measure of the potential risk of FDI. 
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3.2.3 No FDI 
The firm is unlucky to draw a very low productivity such that FDI is not profitable. 
In this case, the firm chooses route ① and deposits all its internal fund to get a safe 
return Rn. The profit of this route is πS=(R-1)n. 
 
3.2.4 FDI with Bank Finance 
The firm has an intermediate productivity such that it could make more profit in 
FDI than that from route ①. FDI has an additional risk ϕ2 due to, for example, 
unanticipated institution or policy change or systematic risk in foreign economy. As we 
mentioned above, when a firm goes to a bank, the bank is willing to spend resources on 
monitoring the productivity shocks. For simplicity, we assume that bank monitoring is 
so efficient such that the uncertainty in FDI could be completely eliminated2. The bank 
then conveys the information about ϕ2 to the borrower, allowing the firm to decide 
whether to continue with FDI or abstain from it. However, the firm has to pay a fee for 
the monitoring. Here we assume the information acquisition fee is a fixed share of its 
internal fund. Denote the share for the fee as τ so that after the payment, the firm has 
disposable fund (1-τ)n left. Assume banks have access to the safe return rate R and they 
are perfectly competitive. 
 
                                                   
2 Relaxing such assumption does not change our results. What we are emphasizing is the role of banks’ 
monitor compared to bond finance. 
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3.2.4.1 Abstain from FDI 
If it is told that a bad shock will happen, i.e., ϕ2 is below some threshold value, the 
firm will abstain from FDI and invest its remaining internal funds to get the safe return. 
In this case, the firm ends up with the profit in route ②-1: 
( )( )nRA τπ −−= 111                           (3.3) 
 
3.2.4.2 Engage in FDI 
If it is told that a good shock will happen, i.e., ϕ2 is above a certain threshold value 
and FDI is profitable, the firm will engage in FDI and end up in route ②-2. After paying 
the information acquisition fee, the firm needs to borrow: 
( )nlX iFA τ−−= 1                            (3.4) 
As there is no uncertainty for bank finance anymore, the participation constraint of 
banks is given by: 
AA RXM =                             (3.5) 
where MA denotes the amount of repayment. The profit of the firm in route ②-2 is: 
222 AAiFiFiFA MXlqp −+−=π  
The firm maximizes πA2 subjected to the demand (3.1), technology (3.2), 
borrowing (3.4) and repayment (3.5), which gives the optimal price: 
211 ϕϕε
ε
i
iF
Rp
−
=                              (3.6) 
The price is composed with markup and marginal cost where R is financing cost 
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and labor wage is normalized to 1. The optimal output, labor input, borrowing and 
repayment can be calculated with this price. 
 
3.2.4.3 Expected Profit of Route ② 
The expected profit of route ② depends on both payoffs in sub-route ②-1 and ②-2 
and the corresponding probability of ending up with each route. Firms with different 
initial productivities ϕ1i have different corresponding probabilities. Precisely, firm ϕ1i 
choose sub-route ②-2 instead of ②-1 if and only if: 
12 AA ππ ≥  
which gives a threshold value of the productivity shock ϕ2: 
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The firm will actually do FDI only if the realization of ϕ2, told by the bank, is 
greater than ϕ2*,. Note that ϕ2* is inverse in ϕ1i, which implies that more productive 
firms are able to bear worse shocks and thus more likely to engage in FDI.  
In our example distribution of ϕ2 , we require that ϕ2*∈[1-C, 1+C]. Accordingly, 
we derive the range of ϕ1i  from (3.7) and define the lower and upper bound of ϕ1i  as 
AL and AH respectively.  
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For a firm with initial productivity ϕ1i<AL, even the best shock ϕ2=1+C can not 
bring it profit in FDI, hence the firm will definitely end up with route ②-1. On the 
contrary, if its initial productivity ϕ1i>AH, then even the worst shock ϕ2=1-C can not 
stop the firm from doing FDI (end up with route ②-2). Only those firms whose 
productivities are between AL and AH might end up with either route ②-1 or ②-2. 
Therefore the ex ante expected profit of route ② is derived in the following three cases: 
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Substituting πA1 and πA2 by previous results, and using the uniform distribution of 
F, we have: 
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are positive constants that determine the “slope” of the expected profit as a function of 
initial productivity ϕ1i. 
 
3.2.4.4 Cutoff Productivity of Route ② 
The firm will choose route ② rather than route ① if and only if the expected profit 
of route ② is larger than that of route ①: 
[ ] SAE ππ ≥                               (3.9) 
When condition (3.9) is binding, a unique cutoff productivity ϕ1A* is determined. 
Firms with initial productivity ϕ1i<ϕ1A* will not do FDI with bank finance considering a 
high probability of failing besides the information acquisition fee charged by banks. 
Therefore, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.1: the cutoff productivity for firms to do FDI with bank finance ϕ1A* is 
increasing with the bank cost τ and firm size n.  
 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.1 
 
τ is the share of firm’s initial wealth that is paid for monitoring. A higher τ means a 
higher cost for bank finance, which leads to a higher threshold for firms to access bank 
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loans. Moreover, the cutoff ϕ1A* is increasing with firm size n since larger firms pay 
higher information fee τn with a given τ. Therefore, bank finance is less attractive for 
larger firms. This result is consistent with the one delivered by capital structure 
literature (Cantillo& Wright, 2000). 
 
Proposition 3.2: the cutoff productivity for firms to do FDI with bank finance ϕ1A* is 
decreasing with the uncertainty in foreign investment C.  
 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.1. 
 
When a firm goes to a bank, it pays a fee to eliminate the uncertainty in future 
investment, which is similar to purchasing insurance with a fixed payment. If the 
investment is not risky (lower C and lower variance of ϕ2), it is not worth for the fixed 
fees. Hence going to banks is a less attractive choice; on the other hand, if the 
investment is risky, (higher C and higher variance of ϕ2), it is more worthwhile to pay a 
fixed fee to reduce the risk in foreign production.  
 
3.2.5 FDI with Bond Finance 
A large number of bondholders provide direct finance for firms. They have no 
incentive to monitor the risk of FDI as a result of free riding problem. Therefore, if 
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firms borrow from bondholders, they save the intermediation cost but keep unknown ex 
ante about the potential shocks. When a firm draws a high productivity ϕ1i such that it 
feels “confident” to overcome possible bad shocks, it would rather borrow from 
bondholders directly.  
Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral and the optimal lending contract is similar to 
debt contract where firms take all the risk. The firm and bondholders negotiate the 
amount of lending and corresponding repayment. The productivity shock is realized 
after conducting production and it is only observable by the firm. If the profit after 
repayment to bondholders is non-negative, the firm repays the borrowing and collects 
the remained profit. Otherwise, the firm defaults and its revenue from FDI is completely 
liquidized and taken by bondholders. Similar to banks, bondholders also have access to 
the safe return rate R and they are perfectly competitive.  
 
3.2.5.1 Optimal Contract with Bond Finance 
As labor must be prepaid, the firm with ϕ1i decides how much labor liF to hire for 
FDI ex ante. According to the cost function (3.2), with input liF, the actual output of FDI 
will be: 
( )flq iFiF −= 21~ ϕϕ                           (3.10) 
And the firm’s expectation of output (ex ante target output) is: 
[ ] ( )flqEq iFiFiF −== 1~ ϕ                        (3.11) 
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Thus, we have 
iFiF qq 2~ ϕ=                               (3.12) 
and the actual price (ex post realized price) is given by the inverse demand function 
(3.1): 
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where piF denotes the ex ante target price.  
To finance FDI, the firm needs to borrow 
nlX iFB −=                               (3.14) 
Denote the repayment as MB, which is negotiated by the firm and bondholders. Then the 
actual profit of the firm after repayment to bondholders is given by: 
BBiFiFiFB MXlqp −+−= ~~π                      (3.15) 
The firm will repay MB if and only if πB ≥0. 
The optimal lending contract specifies borrowing XB and repayment MB and the 
payoffs are distributed according to the following plan: 
 If πB ≥0, the firm gets πB and bondholders get MB.  
 If πB <0, the firm defaults and get 0 while bondholders get liquidized value 
of FDI total revenue. 
Note that πB = 0 determines a threshold level of shock ϕ2B* shown in expression 
(3.16) such that if the firm encounters a shock ϕ2<ϕ2B*, it will default.  
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The threshold level of shock ϕ2B* depends on the repayment, firm initial wealth as 
well as target price and output, which are further positively determined by the firm’s 
initial productivity ϕ1i. Hence ϕ2B* is decreasing with ϕ1i, implying that the more 
productive firms are less likely to default.  
Similarly, we require ϕ2B*∈[1-C, 1+C], which gives some partitions on ϕ1i. 
Analogous to the case in bank finance, if ϕ2B*>1+C, i.e., ϕ1i is below some certain level 
BL, this firm will default even if it has the best productivity shock when the firm 
borrows from bondholders; on the other hand, if ϕ2B*<1-C, i.e., ϕ1i is above some level 
BH, this firm will never default even if it encounters the worst shock. Only those firms 
whose productivities are between BL and BH have both possibilities.  
If ϕ2B*∈[1-C, 1+C], the expected profit of FDI with bond finance is: 
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The participation constraint of bondholders is given by: 
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Maximizing (3.17) subject to (3.18) gives the ex ante target price of FDI  
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and the optimal amount of lending: 
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Compared to (3.6), the optimal price includes an extra cost 1/κ induced by 
potential risk. Note that κ is decreasing in C, meaning that a higher potential risk results 
in a higher price.  
Meanwhile, the optimal repayment is given by: 
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Hence the repayment rate on bond finance is: 
BBB XMR /=                                (3.22) 
Proposition 3.3: the repayment rate on bond finance RB is decreasing in productivity ϕ1i, 
and increasing in FDI risk C.  
 
Proof: see Appendix A.3.1. 
 
Comparing to the constant cost of bank finance (fixed monitor cost as well as fixed 
marginal cost), the cost of bond finance is firm-specific, which is increasing with firm’s 
default probability and thus decreasing with firms’ own productivity (See Figure 3.3). 
When FDI is more risky (higher C), the firm has a higher default probability, therefore 
bondholders charge a higher bond rate. On the other hand, if the firm has a higher 
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productivity, it is less likely to default facing the same risk, thus its repayment rate is 
lower.  
 
 
3.2.5.2 Expected Profit of Bond Finance 
The expected profit in route ③ is given by equation (3.17) if ϕ1i∈[BL, BH]. 
Moreover, if ϕ1i<BL, regardless of how high ϕ2 is, the firm will default. If ϕ1i>BH, the 
firm will never default and bondholders charge the repayment rate RB=R. The result is 
summarized by equation (3.23): 
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are positive constants that determine the slope of the expected profit of bond finance.  
 
3.2.6 The Choice between Bank Finance and Bond Finance 
Based on the results derived above, we summarize the relationships between 
expected profits and firm’s initial productivity ϕ1i in route ① (green dashed line), ② 
(red curve) and ③ (black curve) in Figure 3.4. 
 
Three things are worth mentioning in this figure. First, if productivity ϕ1i is 
sufficiently low (lower than ϕ1A*), the profit of FDI trial with either bank finance or 
bond finance is lower than safe return πS due to the monitor cost and existence of risk 
respectively. When ϕ1i<BL, firms using bond finance will lose all their initial wealth n 
because of the liquidation under default. These can be seen from the equations (3.8) and 
(3.23).  
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Second, when productivity is above certain value (AL and BL for bank finance and 
bond finance respectively), the expected profits with both bank finance and bond 
finance are increasing with productivity and that with bond finance E[πB] increases 
faster. This is because the cost of bank finance is constant while the cost of bond finance 
is decreasing with productivity, as figure 3.3 shows. Note that BL needs not to be higher 
than AL. For example, BL < AL when C=0, i.e., there is no risk associated with FDI. In 
this case, no firm uses bank finance. We rule out this uninteresting case by assuming a 
certain level of risk.  
Third, firms make their decisions on production and financing choice by 
comparing the expected profits of each route. Finally, firms are segmented into three 
types by the two cutoff productivities ϕ1A* and ϕ1B*. Those firms whose initial 
productivities are below ϕ1A* will not engage in FDI but get safe return as in route ①. 
Those whose productivities are between ϕ1A* and ϕ1B* borrow from banks and do FDI 
trials since the expected profit is higher than safe return (red curve is above the green 
dashed line). And those whose productivities are higher than ϕ1B* borrow from 
bondholders and engage in FDI as now the black curve is above the red curve.  
 
3.3 Aggregation  
 
After specifying firm-level decisions, we now aggregate over individual firms to 
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form country-wide predictions and take them to the data in next section.  
 
3.3.1 Financial Structure of FDI Sourcing Country 
In the economy, a continuum of firms (the total number is normalized to 1) draws 
productivity ϕ1i from a common distribution G(ϕ1). Denote the number of firms who do 
not engage in FDI, borrow from banks and borrow from bondholders on the aggregate 
level as NS , NA and NB respectively. Then we have 
1=++ BAS NNN , ( )*1AS GN ϕ= , 
( ) ( )*1*1 ABA GGN ϕϕ −= , ( )*11 BB GN ϕ−=                  (3.24) 
We define the financial structure of the economy as the ratio of total bond finance 
over total bank finance: 
T
T
BANK
BONDFinStr =                              (3.25) 
To calculate the financial structure, we integrate firms’ borrowings from banks and 
from bondholders respectively based on their productivities. First we derive the total 
amount of bank finance. Note that not all the firms whose productivities are between 
ϕ1A* and ϕ1B* borrow from banks. Some of them, upon with a bad luck of productivity 
shock, abstain from FDI and do not borrow (route ②-1). Only those firms with 
productivity shock ϕ2>ϕ2* will borrow XA. As XA is given by (3.4), which further 
depends on the realization of productivity shock ϕ2, we have the ex post amount of 
borrowing (substituting the labor demand by the optimal price (3.6) and the 
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corresponding demand (3.1)): 
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Hence the ex ante conditional expected amount of borrowing from banks by firm 
with productivity ϕ1i is given by: 
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By integration on ϕ1i, the total amount borrowed from banks (expected value) is 
given by:  
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where ϕ2* is given by (3.7), and 1-F(ϕ2*) is the probability of borrowing.  
Similarly, the total amount borrowed from bondholders is 
( )∫
∞
=
*
1
1
B
dGXNBOND B
B
T ϕ
ϕ                      (3.27) 
where XB is given by (3.20).  
As we can see from (3.26) and (3.27), the aggregate financial structure depends on 
the two cutoff productivities ϕ1A* and ϕ1B* as well as the distribution of G(ϕ1), which is 
intuitively depicted in Figure 3.5. Given distribution of initial productivity G(ϕ1), the 
aggregate financial structure is determined by the relative position of the two cutoffs, 
since the integration is simply the area between the distribution and the horizontal axis.  
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Figure 3.5 Segmentation of Firms in Production and Finance 
 
3.3.2 Financial Structure and Risk of FDI 
According to the above argument, the aggregate financial structure depends on the 
cutoff productivities for bank finance and bond finance. Therefore, we derive the 
relationship between FDI risk and financial structure by examining the impact of risks 
on two cutoff productivities. Note that ϕ1A* is calculated by equalizing E[πA] and πS 
while ϕ1B* is derived by equalizing E[πA] and E[πB] (see Figure 3.4). We have the 
following lemma: 
 
Lemma 3.1: if ( )11 −> εC , in the expression for the expected profit from bank finance 
(3.8), A1 is increasing in C, A2 is decreasing in C and A3 is increasing in C. In the 
expression for the expected profit from bond finance (3.23), B1 and B2 are decreasing in 
C. 
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Proof: see Appendix A.3.1. 
 
Lemma 1 says that with a higher risk of FDI (higher C), the slope of E[πA] as a 
function of initial productivity is steeper while the slope of E[πB] is flatter (see 
respectively the expressions (3.8) and (3.23)). Therefore with a higher risk, Figure 3.4 
changes to Figure 3.6. 
 
When the risk is higher, bank finance becomes more attractive since bank 
monitoring largely reduces the uncertainty and the expected profit of bank finance is 
therefore higher, resulting in a lower cutoff ϕ1A*. On the contrary, bond finance is more 
expensive as bondholders charge higher risk premiums. In comparison to bank finance, 
an increase in risk results in a much higher cutoff ϕ1B*. This result is driven by the 
slopes change of expected profits of both types of financing and it is independent of the 
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initial positions of the two curves. We therefore make the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.4: other things equal, the higher risk of FDI, the lower financial structure 
of the economy. 
 
Proof: by Figure 3.6 and Lemma 1.  
 
3.3.3 Financial Structure and Productivity 
As Helpman et al. (2004), we assume firms’ productivities in an economy follow 
Pareto distribution. Comparing the distribution of G(ϕ1) and G(ϕ1)’ in Figure 3.7, we 
see that the average productivity of G(ϕ1)’ is higher than G(ϕ1). Meanwhile, fixing the 
two cutoffs ϕ1A* and ϕ1B*, more firms use bond finance in the economy with G(ϕ1)’. 
Hence we expect a higher financial structure under G(ϕ1)’ than G(ϕ1).  
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Proposition 3.5: other things equal, the higher productivity of the home economy, the 
more bond finance relative to bank finance is used. 
 
With proposition 3.5, we extend our discussion to multiple destination countries 
case. Assuming country-specific risk C, it is easily to conclude a pecking order of FDI 
destinations, that is, firms start FDI in countries with lower risks and then go further to 
countries with higher risks. The more productive the firm is, the more destinations it can 
invest and hence the average risk per destination is increasing. On aggregate level, with 
the increase of productivity, a country invests in more destinations, which brings higher 
risks. We thus observe a positive relationship between the financial structure (bond 
finance over bank finance) and the risk of FDI. Importantly, the risk of FDI in current 
discussion is the average risk per destination rather than the risk of one particular 
destination portfolio. Hence this result does not contradict proposition 3.4. Interestingly, 
both proposition 3.4 and 3.5 are supported by our empirical analysis, with risk measured 
by “per-portfolio” and “per-destination country” respectively.  
 
3.4 Facts and Evidences 
 
3.4.1 Data 
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In the section, we examine the relationship of financial structure with productivity, 
outward FDI performance at aggregate country level using the panel data including 24 
countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States) over 1990-2009 period. The share of outward FDI flow of the 24 countries in the 
total world amounts to 80% in 2006. All the relevant variables are summarized in Table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Note: Financial structure is measured as the ratio of bond finance over bank finance. Productivity is 
measured by GDP per hour. Aggregate risk is the grade for destination country risk weighted by its share 
in a sourcing country’s total outward FDI flow. FDI volatility is the absolute value of deviation from trend 
(HP-Filtered). Number of destinations is counted by authors. Average risk per destination is the sum-up 
risk of all destination countries divided by the number of destinations. Risk data is from Euromoney 
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Country Risk Dataset. We take the reverse of the original data, and therefore higher value indicates higher 
risk. Original data for calculating financial structure is from Beck (2010). The data of FDI flows is from 
UNCTAD dataset. All other data are from OECD Dataset. For the calculation of financial structure and 
aggregate risk see the appendix. 
 
3.4.2 Productivity and Location Pecking Order of FDI 
Evidence 1: Countries tend to invest in more destinations over time and the average 
risk per destination of outward FDI increases.3
 
Figure 3.8 The Evolution of Number of Destinations and Productivity 
                                                   
3 Alternatively, we take the distance between FDI sourcing country and its destination country into 
account and calculate the average risk per distance, and we find similar pattern, namely, with the increase 
of the total distance of all destinations, the average risk per distance increase as well.  
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With the productivity growing over time, countries invest in more foreign 
destinations. As depicted in Figure 3.8, productivity and number of FDI destinations of 
a country are increasing simultaneously. They are significantly positively correlated 
except for Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Norway, Spain. The correlation coefficient 
is higher than 0.9 for Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Sweden. 
The average correlation of the 24 countries is 0.61. 
With investing in more destination countries, the average risk per destination is 
increasing (see Figure 3.9), which implies a pecking order of countries in choosing FDI 
destinations from low risk countries to high risk countries.  
 
Figure 3.9 The Rising Average Risk per Destination of FDI 
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3.4.3 Aggregate Risk and Financial Structure of FDI 
From the original country-pair FDI data, we find that the amount of investment 
varies across destinations that have different level of risks. FDI sourcing country adjusts 
its investment in each destination to reduce the aggregate risk of the portfolio. We 
therefore define the aggregate risk of FDI as the weighted risk of all the destinations by 
the share of outward FDI flow to each destination in the total outward FDI flow of the 
sourcing country. When linking it to the financial structure of the sourcing country, we 
have the following observation: 
 
Evidence 2: The higher FDI aggregate risk, the less bond finance relative to bank 
finance is exploited. 
As our model predicts, facing higher risk in foreign investment, bank finance is 
more preferred. In reality, the sourcing country divests from more risky country and 
invests more in safer locations. In aggregation across all the destinations, the negative 
relationship between aggregate risk and financial structure ratio holds (see Figure 3.10).  
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Figure 3.10 Financial Structure and Aggregate Risk of FDI Portfolio 
Note: This graph shows the relationship between a country’s financial structure for FDI and its 
aggregate risk of FDI location portfolio. The aggregate risk is the grade for destination country risk 
weighted by its share in a sourcing country’s total outward FDI flow. It is the pooled data for 24 FDI 
sourcing countries over 1990-2009. Number of observation = 377. corr.= -0.29, coeff. = -24.99***  
 
3.4.4 Financial Structure and Productivity 
The impact of productivity on financial structure works in two ways. When the 
productivity distribution skews towards higher productivity, more firms will use bond 
finance, leading to a higher ratio of bond finance over bank finance. Nevertheless, as 
evidence 1 shows, more firms will tap more risky countries and in that case bank 
finance is more preferred by some firms to reduce uncertainty. The data shows a 
positive relation between productivity and financial structure of FDI, meaning the first 
effect dominates the second one. 
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Figure 3.11  Financial Structure and Productivity 
Note: This graph shows the relationship between a country’s financial structure for FDI and its 
productivity. Financial structure is measured as the ratio of bond finance over bank finance. The 
x-axis gives the GDP per hour as a country-level measurement of productivity. It is the pooled data 
for 24 countries over 1990-2009. Number of observation = 388, coeff. = .0032409*. 
 
3.4.5 Financial Structure and Volatility of FDI 
We implement simple regressions of FDI volatility on financial structure. The 
coefficient of financial structure is positive and significant before and after controlling 
for productivity and average risk of FDI (see Table 3.2), which implies the advantage of 
bank-based financial system in reducing FDI volatility and is consistent with the pattern 
showed in Figure 3.1. 
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Table 3.2 Financial Structure and Volatility of FDI 
Note: FDI volatility is the absolute value of deviation from trend. Financial structure is the ratio of 
bond finance over bank finance.*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Year dummies and country dummies are not reported. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Countries with different financial structures vary in the performance of FDI, 
especially in volatility and locations. We develop a theory on how heterogeneous firms 
choose financing instrument between borrowing bank loans and issuing corporate bonds 
to finance FDI, and investigate the link of financial structure and country-level FDI 
performance. We establish an asymmetric information model where the hidden 
information is the productivity shock that happens when the firms engage in FDI. As the 
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delegated monitors, banks are willing to spend resources to acquire information about 
the coming shocks while bondholders are not motivated to do so as a result of free 
riding problem. Our model predicts that firms with higher productivity, hence with more 
resistance to bad shocks, are more likely to use corporate bonds whereas firms with 
lower productivities resort to bank finance since banks help reduce the uncertainty ex 
ante. On the other hand, the risk expectation in potential FDI host countries is a key 
determinant on firm’s financing choice. Firms investing in more risky countries prefer 
bank finance to bond finance.  
We test the theory with the panel data including 24 large FDI sourcing countries 
over 1990-2009. We find that countries with higher aggregate productivity, less risky 
investment portfolio of locations have higher ratio of bond finance over bank finance, 
which are consistent with the model’s predictions. Meanwhile, after controlling for 
productivity and risk, more employment of bond finance relative to bank finance leads 
to higher volatility of FDI.  
This research contributes to the emerging literature on financial development and 
firms’ internationalization with emphasis on the impact of the type other than the 
availability of external financial resources on FDI. It also differs from the existing 
capital structure literatures by proposing productivity as a determinant of financing 
choices. 
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Appendix 3.1 
Proofs of Proposition 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and Lemma 3.1 
 
We begin with proof of lemma 3.1. Note that  
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complete the proof that A1 is increasing in C, A2 is decreasing in C and A3 is increasing 
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which is greater than 2, (and the empirical analysis shows 8.3=ε , Bernard, Eaton, 
Jensen and Kortum, 2003), and C is between 0 and 1, condition 
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satisfied. Therefore B1 and B2 are decreasing in C. 
 
With the result of Lemma 3.1, proposition 3.2 that ϕ1A* is decreasing in C can be 
shown by Figure 3.6. 
 
Proposition 3.1 can be seen from the expression of the profit (3.8). When τ is 
higher, ceteris paribus, the expected profit curve of bank finance in figure 3.4 (the red 
curve) is moved down while the expected profit of no FDI (the green line) is intact. 
Hence the cutoff productivity for bank finance is higher. When the initial wealth n 
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increases, both the green line and the red curve move up but the green line moves more 
due to the fact that τn is paid as monitoring cost. Hence the cutoff productivity ϕ1A* is 
also higher. 
 
Proposition 3.3 discusses the cost of bond financing. Substitute MB and XB by the 
results from optimal contract and optimal target price and labor demand, and take the 
partial derivatives with respect to ϕ1i or C to complete the proof. 
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Appendix 3.2  
Calculation of Financial Structure of FDI 
 
We have financial structure data for the whole economy of each FDI sourcing 
country which includes the finance for FDI as well as for domestic investment. 
Remember that we are trying to build a relationship between the financial structure and 
FDI risk where the financial structure is the one for FDI only. Therefore, we need to 
isolate the finance for FDI from that for domestic investment and figure out the 
financial structure of only FDI firms (aggregate FDI firms’ financial structure). Our data 
remains at macro level. 
Since we have assumed that all firms raise their finance at their home countries, the 
investment that has impact on S of home country is just D while Inward FDI I is 
financed from foreign country. Remember D includes investment in home country as 
well as in foreign country. Hence, the financial structure S is the overall outcome of SD 
and SF where the weight on SD is (T-I)/D and the weight on SF is F/D. We then have: 
SS
D
FS
D
IT
FD =+
−
                         (A.3.1) 
The relationship between SD and SF is tricky. According to the model and theories 
on financial structure, the higher the investment risk is, the more bank finance will be 
used compared to bond finance, which suggests an inverse relationship between risk and 
financial structure where financial structure means the ratio of bond finance over bank 
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finance. For simplicity, we assume the relationship follows equation (A.3.2): 
FFDD RSRS =                       (A.3.2) 
Inserting it into equation (A.3.1) we have the financial structure for FDI  
D
F
R
R
D
IT
SS
D
F
F
+
−
=  
Table A.3.1 Variable Denotations  
Variable Label Description 
T national total investment Gross Capital Formation as proxy, data available directly
F total outward FDI flow data available directly 
I total inward FDI flow data available directly 
D domestic firms’ total investment 
FITD +−= , investment of domestic firms, both 
FDI firms and non FDI firms, in both home country and 
foreign country, data available by calculation 
RF risk of outward FDI Agg.Risk data available by calculation 
RD risk of domestic production sourcing country risk, data available directly 
SF financial structure of OFDI firms variable of interest 
SD financial structure of non FDI firms intermediate variable 
S financial structure of the whole economy data available directly 
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Appendix 3.3 
Calculation of Aggregate Risk of FDI 
We get the country-specific risk rating data in grade ranging from 0 to 100, which 
takes four categories of risk including economic, political, structural and credit access 
risk into account. Higher grade implies lower risk.  
Consider a country i investing in N foreign countries. Its risk in FDI is the 
aggregate risk of location portfolio. To assess the aggregate risk, we construct an index 
for FDI sourcing country which is the weighted average risk of its host countries, the 
weight being the share of outward FDI flow of each host country in the total outward 
FDI flow of the sourcing country.  
For example, consider country i as an FDI sourcing country which invests in N 
foreign countries. Denote the outward FDI flow to each foreign country as F1, F2, …, 
FN and the risk grade of each corresponding destination as R1, R2,…, RN. Then the 
aggregate FDI risk for country i is 
∑
∑= =
=
N
j N
j j
j
ji
F
F
RRiskAgg
1
1
.  
Assume country risk grade Rj is constant over time during the period we examine. 
Because of the change of the share 
∑ =
N
j j
j
F
F
1
, the weighted average risk is time variant. 
Also note that although , it is not necessary that  
because FDI flow can be negative. 
[ 100,0∈jR ] [ ]100,0∈iAggRisk
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Chapter 4 
 
Financial Underdevelopment, Distortional Lending, 
and Export Market Survival: 
Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Compared to enterprises engaging in domestic businesses only, exporters are more 
dependent on a stable and strong financial support for working capital and risk 
insurance (Amiti and Weinstein, 2009). In the downturn of international trade during the 
recent global financial crisis, exporters have been forced to contract exports or even exit 
from foreign market due to rising cost and limited availability of external credit, apart 
from the shrinking market demand (Auboin, 2009; Chor and Manova, 2011). As the 
incumbent exporters play a dominant role in country-level export performances 
(Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Eaton et al., 2008; Manova and Zhang, 2009), how to 
support their survival and operations in foreign market is a topic of vital importance.  
An emerging stream of literature focuses on the role of finance in fueling trade 
performance. While it is well recognized that finance is a key determinant of firms’ 
export participation and trade volumes (Beck, 2002; Beck, 2003; Muuls, 2008; Berman 
and Hericourt, 2010; Manova, 2007; Demir and Dahi, 2011), the impact of finance on 
exporter’s survival is largely neglected. In reality, exporters’ failures in foreign markets 
can be affected by the development of domestic financial system due to the following 
intrinsic disadvantages of exporters in financing. Exporting requires more external 
finance to cover additional fixed cost and variable cost, however due to longer shipment 
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time and higher risks involved in international businesses, exporters generally find it 
more difficult to obtain sufficient funding. Therefore, they are more financially 
constrained and more sensitive to financial environment. (Chor and Manova, 2011; 
Feenstra et al., 2011; Manova et al., 2011). Moreover, compared to pure domestic 
businesses, cross-border activities have to endure additional negative shocks such as 
demand downturn in overseas markets or unexpected exchange rate fluctuations, all of 
which could induce a liquidity problem in the short run for exporters. Therefore, timely 
liquidity provision as a result of financial development is more favorable for exporters 
(Beck, 2002; Raddatz, 2006). Since exporters, in contrast to multinational firms, are 
more reliant on domestic finance, the development of domestic financial system is a 
crucial determinant of exporters’ survival. With the development of domestic financial 
system, exporters can have better access to external finance, especially long-term 
finance, consequently, they are less likely to encounter a financial problem and exit 
foreign market.  
This chapter aims to fill the research gap of linking domestic financial 
development and export market survival. We use the data for Chinese manufacturing 
exporters during 1998-2008 to examine how the Chinese financial system, in transition 
toward a marketized one, shapes the dynamics of Chinese exporters in foreign markets. 
Although Chinese stock market and bond market have developed rapidly in recent years, 
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bank credit is still a dominant source in firms’ external financing1. Therefore, in this 
research we focus on the development of banking system as the proxy indicator of 
financial development. We label the Chinese financial system as ‘underdeveloped’ from 
the perspective of fostering businesses. Firstly, China was among the countries that had 
the highest financing obstacles and most limited access to bank loans (World Economic 
Forum, 2010; Huang, 2006), which meant that Chinese firms faced severe credit 
constraints (Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006). Secondly, the financial system of China has 
been heavily state-dominated, which has not been always profit-oriented or efficient in 
lending (Allen et al., 2005; Guariglia and Poncet, 2008; Hasan et al., 2009; Lin and 
Zhang 2009). State-owned banks (SOBs), as the channel of state-owned enterprises’ 
budget allocation, accumulated a significant amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
that hindered their operations on a market rule. Although the NPL problem had been 
virtually dissolved under the direct intervention of Chinese government during the 
five-year interim period after China’s accession into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001 (Deng et al., 2011), and the five major SOBs (“Big Five”2) have 
                                                        
1 The domestic raised capital in stock market is 5.27% of the amount of bank loan in 2009. Domestic and 
foreign raised capital in stock market is only 2.72% of fixed assets investment. Source: National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, The People’s Bank of China, and China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
2 Traditionally, there were four mega-sized state-owned banks, which were referred to as “Big Four”. 
After 2006, China Banking Regulatory Commission added the Bank of Communications to the list of 
“large-sized state-controlled banks”, after which “Big Five” replaces “Big Four” as the jargon employed 
in the Chinese banking sector to denote the top five mega-sized state-owned banks. 
  ‐ 90 ‐
become listed public companies, strong state presence still influences the decision 
mechanism of the whole banking system (Huang, 2009). Thirdly, due to the high level 
of state intervention in financial resources allocation, financial resources are distributed 
disproportionally among different types of firms and regions, SOBs have a strong 
“political pecking order” bias in issuing credit towards SOEs and foreign-invested 
enterprises over private enterprises, so that the private firms are most credit constrained 
(Huang, 2003; Linton, 2006; Poncet et al., 2010). Moreover, bank credit policy 
differentiation as an important means of implementing state support for regional 
economic development, together with the difference in foreign capital presence and 
liberalization in bank sectors and financial resources immobility across regions (World 
Bank, 2005; Guariglia and Poncet, 2008; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005), results in 
financial development variation across provinces, which will be discussed in the later 
part of this chapter. 
We study whether the financial development as a result of financial system reform 
unleashes Chinese exporters’ financial constraints and facilitates their survivals in 
foreign markets as well as whether this effect is homogeneous across industries, regions 
and different types of firms. In line with our discussion on ‘financial underdevelopment’ 
and relevant literature, we measure the level of provincial financial development with 
four indicators, namely size, efficiency, term structure of bank credit and the level of 
state intervention in funding investment. We find that financial development, either 
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better availability of bank loans or higher efficiency of bank lending, increases exporter 
survival. These effects are augmented in industries with greater SOE presence, 
manifesting the prevailing financial distortion against non-state enterprises in these 
industries. The term structure of bank credit also matters but in a way that is contrary to 
a generalized case. The increasing ratio of medium and long term credits relative to 
short term ones expropriates the survival of exporting manufacturing firms, mainly due 
to the fact that more and more medium and long term credits have been directed to 
non-manufacturing investments during the sample period. Finally lower level of state 
intervention in financial resources allocation is favorable for exporter survival but the 
effect could be dampened or even offset by high SOE presence. Moreover, financial 
development impacts different types of firms unevenly. It benefits domestic private 
firms significantly but has almost no effect on SOEs. For foreign-invested exporters, 
only the degree of state intervention and bank lending efficiency matter. Finally, in 
contrast to the negative effect of financial distortion in the eastern and coastal provinces, 
government participation plays a positive role on export survival through providing 
funds and public services in the western region.  
The main contribution of this study is that it complements the quickly growing 
body of literature on finance and export by firstly exploring the relationship between 
financial development and exporter survival. The role of finance in fostering 
international trade has been confirmed by firm-level analyses (e.g. Muuls, 2008; 
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Berman and Hericourt, 2010; Manova et al., 2011). Although the impact of finance on 
export participation and volumes has drawn due attention, its relationship with firms’ 
sustainability in foreign market has been untouched. Moreover, few of the existing 
literature examine the effect of macro-level financial development on exporters’ 
firm-level performance.3 Our work builds a direct link between them and provides 
evidences of benefit of financial development in supporting exporter survival.  
In addition, taking China as the subject for finance-trade nexus study generates 
more fruitful results. What makes China an interesting case is that China has achieved 
exceptional performance in export, measured either by volume or growth, with the 
support of a defective financial system and sizeable foreign capital. Comparing to the 
well documented function of foreign capital in partly compensating domestic financial 
market imperfection and fostering trade (Hericourt and Poncet, 2009; Li and Yu, 2009; 
Egger and Kesina, 2010; Jarreau and Poncet, 2011; Manova et al., 2011), our results 
illustrate the mixed moderating role of government in the impact of financial 
development on export. On one hand, due to the absence of high quality legal and 
financial institutions, the government, acting as an implicit credit guarantor for SOEs, 
aggravates the financial distortion against non-state firms and worsens their export 
survival. On the other hand, in regions that are less developed and lack good financial 
                                                        
3  Manova (2011), Jarreau and Poncet (2011) examine the impact of financial development and 
liberalization on export at sector level. Berman and Hericourt (2010) investigate how the effects of 
productivity and firm collateral are magnified by financial development.  
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infrastructure, the government plays a positive role in mobilizing financial resources to 
satisfy enormous financing needs (Rajan and Zingales, 2001), and thus facilitates 
exporter survival. These evidences extend the line of research on financial development 
and trade by proposing the significance of government activity, especially for countries 
with underdeveloped financial system and low quality of financial and legal institutions.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
baseline model and data. Section 3 describes variable constructions and summary 
statistics. Section 4 presents our results on financial development and export market 
survival, including the general results and results of sub-sample regressions broken 
down by firm ownership and region. The last section concludes. 
 
4.2 Data and Empirical Model  
 
4.2.1 Data  
For this study of the relationship between financial development in China and the 
survival of Chinese manufacturing firms in international markets, we employ and 
integrate firm- and province-level data from three sources, namely National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBS), China Statistical Yearbooks (CSY), and Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking (ACFB).  
The main body of the integrated data is firm-level panel data of 30 Chinese 
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manufacturing industries for the period 1998 to 2008. The data are originally obtained 
from the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics (ARIES), which is compiled 
by NBS. This report provides detailed firm-level financial and operational information 
for all state-owned enterprises and large non-state firms with annual turnover above five 
million RMB (over $600,000 if exchange rate was 8.27 RMB/USD). The ARIES is the 
most comprehensive firm-level dataset ever edited by the NBS, accounting for about 
90% of the total output in most industries. The dataset covers all 30 two-digit 
manufacturing industries (i.e. 580 four-digit sectors) throughout all 31 provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities (“provinces” henceforth) in China. This dataset 
has been employed by various Chinese studies in the literature (e.g. Li and Yu, 2009; 
Egger and Kesina, 2010; Feenstra et al., 2011). 
As the focus of this study is to examine the impact of financial development on 
export market survival, we drop the firms without any international presence during the 
entire sample period. Due to omissions in data collection, NBS does not include export 
value in the survey in 2004. Therefore we drop that year and are left with ten years. We 
also delete some observations during the adjustment of industrial codes and remove 
missing values from the data. In addition, we pay particular attention to possible 
organizational changes, including restructuring, mergers and acquisitions by 
undertaking extensive checks of firm name, founding year, geographic code and 
industry code. These cleaning processes result in a final sample of 170,396 firms. 
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Another stream of data is province level data on financial development as main 
independent variable and factor endowments as additional control variables. These data 
are collected from annual issues of CSY and ACFB and they are commonly used in 
literature on financial development in China (e.g. Guariglia and Poncet, 2008; Berger et 
al., 2009; Hasan et al., 2009). 
 
4.2.2 Empirical Model 
In estimating the hazard rate of exiting export market, we use the Cox proportional 
hazards model (Cox, 1972), an advantage of which is that it does not rely on 
assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard, e.g. Weibull distribution. Indeed the 
hazard during the whole process of export, rather than the baseline hazard of export, is 
our primary focus. Cox model has been widely adopted in business event history 
analysis (e.g. Disney et al., 2003). The termination of the export constitutes the event to 
be empirically tested with Cox model. The dependent variable was a dichotomous 
variable, coded 1 if the final export behavior was observed before the end of the sample 
2008, and 0 otherwise4. The survival of each firm’s export is assumed to follow its own 
hazard function, h(t), expressed as: 
h(t) = h0(t)e(βX)              (4.1) 
                                                        
4 A firm that stops doing international business may still survive in domestic market. As the focus of this 
paper is to examine the firm dynamics in international markets, we do not analyze the firm survival in 
domestic markets. 
  ‐ 96 ‐
where h(t) is a conditional hazard at year t given that firm exports in the previous year. 
h0(t) is baseline hazard without any prior assumption of function forms. X is a collection 
of variables that might affect the export hazard of firms. Collectively β denotes the 
coefficients for each variable in X. When all variables in X take values of zero, 
h(t)=h0(t), i.e. the conditional hazard equals the baseline hazard. X includes the 
following variables presented in next section. 
 
4.3 Variable Constructions and Summary Statistics 
 
4.3.1 Province- and Industry-level Variables 
Financial Development 
We construct several variables to indicate the dynamics of financial development 
based on the data from CSY and ACFB. In the literature, country-level financial 
development indicators are usually employed for cross-country panel studies (e.g. 
Tsoukas, 2011). However, as the current research is focusing on the effectiveness of 
financial development on the firm survival in a single country, it is ideal to construct 
province-level indicators to capture the vast regional variations (Guariglia and Poncet, 
2008). This can also be justified by the facts that the majority of Chinese bank loans are 
granted within provinces and the capital market within China is relatively segmented 
(Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). 
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As China’s financial system is dominated by the five mega-sized state banks that 
direct a considerably high volume of financial resources to generally inefficient 
state-owned enterprises, traditionally used indicators of financial intermediary 
development for the developed economies might not be able to reflect the full situation 
of the Chinese financial development (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008). In light of the above 
considerations, we construct a bundle of four complementary province-level indicators 
to demonstrate different aspects of “financial development” for each year of the 
observation period, 1998-2008. 
FD1 is the ratio of total loans issued by banks and financial institutions to GDP, 
which measures the size of financial system and financial depth. FD1 denotes the most 
important function of financial intermediaries in credit allocation, and its magnitude 
quantifies the financial resources available for investment.  
FD2 is defined as total loans divided by total deposits. Traditionally, the 
loan-deposit ratio has two layers of implications. Firstly, it is a measurement of 
efficiency of financial sector in intermediating savings and investments. Higher ratio 
indicates higher efficiency. Secondly, FD2 also implies the funding source of loans. A 
ratio above 1 implies that loans come from non-deposit sources, e.g. money market or 
capital market (Beck et al., 2010). Lower loan-deposit ratio indicates a prudent and 
healthier financial system with higher profit potential, as customer deposits are viewed 
as the safest and cheapest funding compared to the borrowings from alternative sources 
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(Deng et al., 2011).  
FD3 is the ratio of medium- and long-term loans over short-term loans. Debt 
structure matters since the mismatch of debt maturity with timing of cash flow 
generation may induce refinancing problem and liquidity risk. Thus, long-term debt is 
preferred, especially for firms whose credit rating is not high enough (Diamond, 1991a) 
and firms in mature legal societies (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998). We include 
FD3 to capture the compositional change of financial development and complement the 
size effect of FD1.  
FD4 is calculated as the ratio of fixed asset investments financed by domestic 
loans relative to those financed by state budgetary appropriation, which reversely 
measures the extent of state intervention in financial development. Higher ratio implies 
higher level of substitution of domestic loans for state budget and less state intervention. 
Industry SOE Presence 
To examine the heterogeneous effect of financial development on exporter survival 
across industries, we design regressions including interaction terms of the above FDs 
with industry-specific SOE presence (SOE Pre) which proxies the degree of lending 
distortion between state and non-state firms in each of the 580 four-digit manufacturing 
sectors.   
As discussed above, Chinese banks exhibit an ownership bias towards SOEs in 
granting credit due to the prevailing political pecking order in China (Huang, 2003). 
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This bias has witnessed a significant decline with massive SOE privatization and SOB 
reform in the recent decade. However, such ownership discrimination still prevails, not 
only as a result of direct government intervention, but also due to the rational decision 
making of commercial banks. A body of empirical evidence suggests that financial 
development depends on the quality of law institutions including the protection of 
investors, contract enforcement, accounting standards and information disclosure etc. 
(La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). Due to the 
absence of high quality institutions in China, banks consider firms’ political connection 
as a signal of good credit and strong solvency. Therefore, SOEs usually have the 
strongest financing power while private firms find it much harder to get finance from 
the banks (Cull and Xu, 2005; Faccio 2006). Private enterprises have to build good 
connections with the state sector, e.g. becoming “red capitalists”, so that they can obtain 
a larger volume of bank loans (Li et al., 2008; Du and Girma, 2010). 
Since SOEs and private firms are competing for limited credit resources in 
domestic credit markets, the heavy presence of SOEs in an industry could restrict 
private firms from tapping financial resources from banking sectors and exacerbate their 
credit constraints. Therefore, other things being equal, we expect that domestic private 
enterprises in industries with high SOE presence are in more desperate need of external 
financial resources, so that the marginal benefit of any additional financial development 
that can be possibly received by private enterprises will be higher in these industries. 
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In addition, heterogeneous industrial SOE presence could influence exporter 
survival from non-financial aspects. Although China has privatized and liberalized most 
of industries after radical SOE reforms, the government is still in tight grip on some 
strategic industries, e.g. coal, tobacco, petroleum, transport equipment (The Economist, 
2011), which are generally highly monopolistic. Relatively high industry concentration 
and low export intensity in these industries weaken firm competitiveness in foreign 
markets (Egger and Kesina, 2010). Thus, we predict that the prevalence of SOE might 
be disadvantageous for exporter survival. 
We measure industry-level SOE presence with output share, i.e., the total output of 
SOEs in every four-digit industry over the total output of the whole industry based on 
the NBS firm-level data5. To smooth temporary fluctuations in output, we take the 
average over time for each industry (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  SOE Pre, as a result 
of industrial strategy and SOE reform, is largely exogenous to financial development.   
Other Control Variables 
To ensure that the effect of financial development is not intertwined with that of 
other provincial factors, we also include interaction terms of provincial factor 
abundance with industrial factor intensity to account for traditional sources of 
comparative advantages that might impact exporter survival in foreign markets. We 
measure province level physical capital abundance K/L with fixed asset investment per 
                                                        
5 We also try the SOE share in terms of employment and total assets. The results are highly consistent for 
all the measurements. 
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capita, and human capital abundance H/L with the share of college graduates in the 
population aged over six. These two variables vary across provinces and change along 
time. As for the factor intensities in each industry, we proxy capital intensity (CapInt) 
with fixed asset per employee of the median firm, and proxy human capital intensity 
(HumInt) with the average wage of the median firm in that industry. Both CapInt and 
HumInt are ratios aggregated over time and across provinces, which capture the natural 
characteristics of each industry. Similar variables have been employed in the literature 
to control for endowment abundance and factor intensity (Braun, 2003; Hur et al., 2006; 
Manova, 2007). The factor intensity variables are calculated using the NBS firm-level 
data based on the following formulas: 
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
= ∑∑
t
ijt
t
ijtjj EmployeeFixedAssetMedianCapInt  
⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
= ∑∑
t
ijt
t
ijtjj EmployeeTotalWageMedianHumInt  
where the subscripts denote firm i in industry j in year t. Finally we also include 
province, industry, and year dummy variables to control for other unobservable factors.  
 
4.3.2 Firm-level Variables 
We construct several firm-level variables to control firm financial performance, 
vulnerability and other characteristics which are widely documented by theoretical and 
empirical literature as important determinants of firm survival. More importantly, they 
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act as the channels through which province-level financial development affects 
firm-level survival in international businesses. 
Age. Age is an important factor affecting firm survival (e.g. Dunne et al., 1989; 
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004; Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006). It is measured by 
the length between the year of firm foundation and the current year. We include Age and 
a squared term of Age to measure potential curvilinear relationship (Esteve-Perez and 
Manez-Castillejo, 2008). Young firms are more likely to encounter financial distress 
because of their huge demand of development funds, e.g. for advertisements, R&D in 
new product and exploiting new market etc. Meanwhile, younger firms are generally not 
able to build up good reputations, based on which to obtain sufficient finance from 
investors. This financing dilemma becomes more pronounced for exporters as they are 
facing higher fund requirements and more risks relative to domestic producers. In 
comparison, older firms are more likely to accumulate large amount of internal funds. 
Moreover, the declining information asymmetry with outsiders eases external financing 
difficulty. In addition, a firm with a long history of export has acquired sufficient 
knowledge of the international market and has a strong capability to adjust to market 
adversaries.  
Size. Firm size can be positively related with the survival rate of firms. First of all, 
a larger firm is more likely above the average scale of other firms in its industry, and 
can therefore benefit from the economies of scale and cost advantage. Moreover, a 
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larger firm tends to have more diversified product portfolio and can effectively hedge 
the uncertainty facing any individual product. In addition, larger firms, typically more 
collateralized compared to smaller ones, are less affected by lower liquidity and higher 
short-term interest rates, and therefore, less sensitive to the tightening of monetary 
policy and worsening credit conditions (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Perez-Quiros and 
Timmermann, 2000). We measure firm size with natural logarithm of total assets. 
Leverage. We measure leverage as firm total loans divided by its total assets, 
which is an indicator of firm financial health condition and has a negative effect on firm 
survival from a traditional point of view (Myers, 1977; Zingales, 1998). However it is 
not necessarily the case in China. Chinese SOEs are generally over-leveraged as a result 
of soft budget constraint, as they are able to obtain bank loans and other forms of 
financial supports from the government relatively easily. In contrast, private firms are 
more reliant on internal funds and their leverages are under the optimal level due to 
widely existing financing discrimination under a state dominant financial system. 
Therefore high leverage could be a burden for SOEs, while it could be an indicator of 
capability of private firms to break their financial constraint and exploit external finance. 
Thus, we expect that the effect of leverage on firm hazard rate for SOEs is positive 
while that for private firms could be negative.  
Profitability. We use total profit divided by sales to measure a firm’s profitability. 
Firms with high profitability are less likely to suffer from financial distress and exit due 
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to two reasons. Firstly, they can accumulate internal funds and are less dependent on 
external finance. Secondly, good performance increases firm value so that they can get 
external finance more easily. Therefore, we expect a negative sign of profitability on 
hazard rate. 
Export intensity. We also include Export intensity as a control variable. It is 
measured using export divided by total output. A higher export intensity denotes a 
higher degree of exposure to the knowledge pool in the international market, and is 
therefore associated with a higher possibility of receiving knowledge spillover (Zhang 
and Li, 2010). Moreover highly export-oriented enterprises in export-oriented countries 
like China can obtain more trade credit and financial support from the government, 
trade partners or their parent company (Ianchovichina, 2007; Girma et al., 2009). In the 
literature, evidence has been found to support the positive relationship between export 
intensity and firm survival rate for Chinese SOEs (Girma and Gong, 2008). 
 
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Firm Failure in Export Market 
170,396 firms that appear at least one year in the sample during 1998 to 2008 are 
kept for survival analysis. There are averagely 9,216 firms exiting from the international 
market every year. By the end of the sample, 92,159 firms quit doing international 
business, accounting for 54.1% of the whole sample. The ownership composition of 
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market failures is shown in Table 4.1. The number of failures soared up one year after 
China’s accession into WTO in the end of 2001, indicating a reshuffling effect of the 
trade liberalization. Table 4.1 also reports the ownership structure of exiting exporters. 
The portion of SOEs decreased from 36.4% in 1998 to 1.6% in 2007. That sharp decline 
was mainly caused by three factors. Firstly, when Premier Zhu Rongji was in power 
during 1998 and 2003, his cabinet implemented a radical SOE reform, and closed down 
a considerable number of poorly performing and small-sized SOEs (Zweig, 2001; The 
Economist, 1997). These SOEs disappeared from international markets too. Secondly, 
during the market liberalization process, the private sector boomed rapidly. The NBS 
firm data show that the private sector had only 49.2% of total firms, while the SOEs 
accounted for 34.8% in 1998. By the end of the sample period, domestic private 
enterprises accounted for 78.9% of all firms, while the SOEs shrank to 2.6%. It is 
therefore natural to expect a much lower portion of SOEs in the exporters that failed in 
international markets. Thirdly, after the SOE reform, the remaining SOEs are productive 
and subtantial enough to sustain in international business (Woetzel, 2008), and thus 
maintain a rather small portion of all firm exits. 
Following Chen and Groenewold (2010), we dichotomize 31 provinces into two 
groups, namely the eastern and western regions. The eastern region includes the 11 
coastal provinces and capital Beijing, while the western region refers to the rest of 
China, i.e. the other 20 inland provinces. The eleven eastern provinces contributed to 
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more than 90% of total export in China during 2003-2008. Table 4.2 reports the failure 
rates for exporters in different locations and with different ownership types, which 
shows that exporter failure is systematically lower in the eastern region, 49.4% 
comparing to 66.9% in the western region. 
 
Table 4.1 Exporter Exits: Total Number and Breakdown by Firm Type 
 
Year Total  SOEs 
Foreign-invested 
enterprises 
Domestic private 
enterprises 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
1998 11 100% 4 36.4% 3 27.3% 4  36.4%
1999 5,833 100% 776 13.3% 2,129 36.5% 2,922  50.1%
2000 4,845 100% 601 12.4% 2,001 41.3% 2,248  46.4%
2001 1,855 100% 245 13.2% 774 41.7% 837  45.1%
2002 5,651 100% 384 6.8% 1,956 34.6% 3,311  58.6%
2003 20,777 100% 872 4.2% 7,833 37.7% 12,072  58.1%
2005 15,128 100% 454 3.0% 5,189 34.3% 9,470  62.6%
2006 18,084 100% 506 2.8% 5,624 31.1% 11,954  66.1%
2007 19,975 100% 320 1.6% 8,909 44.6% 10,727  53.7%
Total 92,159 100% 4,147 4.5% 34,375 37.3% 53,545  58.1%
Note: Due to omissions in data collection, NBS does not include export value in the survey in 2004. The 
final year of the sample, i.e. 2008, does not have any firm failure, which is called “right censoring”. 
Moreover, in each region, foreign enterprises have lower failure rate than SOEs 
and private enterprises. The above-average survival performance of foreign enterprises 
can be largely explained by their relatively stronger international linkage with upstream 
suppliers and downstream buyers. The data from Chinese Customs6 show that the 
export value of foreign enterprises contributed 50-55% to the total export in China 
                                                        
6 Calculated by the authors based on the monthly data retrieved from China Economic Information 
Database (http://www.cei.gov.cn/). 
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every year from 2001 until 2010. Such high export contribution is caused by the strong 
export orientation of foreign enterprises driven by their resource-seeking strategic 
positioning (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1998). The 
assembly trade export, i.e. original equipment manufacturing (OEM), conducted by 
foreign enterprises accounted for 77% of total export of foreign enterprises, and 78% of 
all assembly trade export conducted by all types of enterprises in China during 2006 and 
2010 7 . Possessing relatively advanced technology and management, multinational 
enterprises do have advantage compared to their counterparts in host market, which is 
consistent with the “ownership, location, and internalization” hypothesis proposed by 
Dunning (1977; 1981). 
Table 4.2 
Average Failure Rate of Exporters in the Eastern and Western Regions  
during 1998-2008 (%) 
 
 Eastern region Western region 
Private Enterprises 52.2 70.4 
SOE 73.1 78.0 
Foreign Enterprises 43.4 52.9 
Overall 49.4 66.9 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 Same data source as indicated in Footnote 6. 
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Financial Development and Distortion in China 
 
Figure 4.1 Financial Development across Regions and Evolution over Time 1998-2008 
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Note: The value reported is the average for each region at a certain year.  
Figure 4.1 show the dynamics of financial development of eastern and western 
regions respectively through 1998-2008. In either region, FD1 uniformly exhibited an 
upward trend between 1998 and 2003, and declined since 2004. This pattern is a direct 
outcome of government policy. To fight the negative effect of Asian financial crisis, 
Chinese government took measures to loosen credit expansion and stimulate investment 
in 1998 and 1999, including reduction of reserve requirement, elimination of credit 
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quotas for commercial banks and other administrative tools to increase credit supply, 
which resulted in the substantial financial deepening during 1998 to 2003. Facing the 
increasingly apparent economic overheating, a new round of tightening credit policies 
was implemented in 2003 and 2004, including increase of deposit reserve ratio, together 
with some administrative and legal interventions on credit grant. The co-movement of 
FD1 and government policies indicates the great importance of credit allocation, as a 
countercyclical policy instrument, for investment-driving Chinese economy. 
FD2 decreases throughout the entire sample period. As we discussed above, 
although a higher loan-to-deposit ratio indicates a higher operational efficiency of 
financial intermediates, a lower FD2 does not necessarily represent efficiency loss in 
the Chinese economy context. For example, Deng et al. (2011) find that the competition 
from foreign banks significantly leads to contraction of lending from Chinese banks, 
suggesting the banking system has become more prudent in granting loans after China’ 
accession into WTO in 2001. The extraordinarily high FD2 (greater than 1) in the 
western region before 2000 was caused by the central bank relending as a special form 
of subsidy. To support the economic development in less developed provinces, Chinese 
central bank used to assign higher credit quotas for banks in those provinces and 
provided them additional funds to meet the lending quotas which could not be 
sufficiently financed by local deposits (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Guariglia and Poncet, 
2008). However, such government-dominated financial resource allocation pursues 
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more social objectives such as poverty reduction rather than pure economic objectives 
(Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). Therefore, the decrease of FD2 resulting from the 
dilution of government direct intervention in the western region may also imply a higher 
efficiency of banking system based on market rules. 
FD3 has been increasing since 1998, and the regional difference is modest. While 
the increase of medium and long term loans relative to short term loans is generally 
viewed as a result of development of financial institution (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999), it is also affected by government intervention in China. Sun et al. 
(2005) have shown that the share of long term loans is significantly higher in provinces 
with more state intervention. Governments can facilitate long term loan issuance 
through granting implicit loan guarantees (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
Therefore, state firms can take the advantage of connection with governments to obtain 
long term loans. Non-state firms instead mainly depend on short term borrowing and 
rollover of short term debt claims. Besides, long term loans, as one of policy 
instruments to boost industrial development and alleviate regional disparity, usually 
concentrate on state monopoly non-tradable sectors, strategic industries, especially in 
economically backward provinces. For example, the top industries receiving medium 
and long term loans were real estate, electricity power, public transportation etc in the 
first quarter of 2006, and those loans mainly went to real estate in the eastern region in 
contrast to infrastructure and energy in the west (Wang et al., 2006). 
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FD4 reversely reflects the degree of state intervention and financial distortion. It 
increased from 1999 in the eastern provinces, suggesting gradual withdrawal of 
government. In stark contrast, FD4 illustrates a declining trend in the western region, 
which implies governments still play an important role in financing investment. FD4 
exhibits a stronger correlation with the level of economic development in each province.  
All four indicators of financial development as well as GDP per capita for each 
province are reported in Table 4.3. The provinces in each group are ranked by their 
arithmetic average GDP per capita over 1998-2008. The data reveal obvious variations 
across provinces. While the eastern provinces observe a higher average FD1 (117.978), 
and FD4 (8.692), the western provinces host a higher FD2 (0.840) and FD3 (0.657). As 
discussed above the contrast between the eastern and western provinces reflects the 
different roles of government in these two regions, which are highly associated with 
provincial economic development. For example the highest FD4 is observed in Tianjin, 
Shanghai and Jiangsu, all of which are the most developed provinces in China, while 
the lowest FD4 is observed in Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet, all of which are relatively 
backward provinces. 
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Table 4.3 Variation across Provinces 
Province FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 GDP per capita
Eastern region 
Shanghai   155.250 0.707 0.623 14.378 427.048 
Beijing  233.059 0.543 0.840 6.374 329.162 
Tianjin   127.536 0.837 0.555 15.650 283.932 
Zhejiang   111.349 0.789 0.410 9.048 226.835 
Jiangsu   81.508 0.728 0.394 11.254 203.202 
Guangdong   116.968 0.660 0.540 9.800 201.640 
Fujian   73.868 0.756 0.576 8.878 169.138 
Liaoning   110.881 0.801 0.470 6.335 166.709 
Shandong   75.329 0.834 0.383 6.616 166.504 
Hebei   74.693 0.691 0.486 6.076 123.877 
Hainan  132.417 0.822 1.038 2.822 96.026 
Eastern region average 117.978 0.749 0.610 8.692 213.102 
Western region 
Inner Mongolia  87.825 0.985 0.682 2.614 131.233 
Heilongjiang   83.910 0.800 0.415 4.786 127.102 
Jilin   124.461 1.049 0.449 4.083 115.325 
Xinjiang 101.503 0.771 0.572 1.979 110.588 
Hubei   88.355 0.895 0.667 2.804 105.669 
Shanxi   120.183 0.721 0.526 8.977 96.927 
Henan   80.672 0.863 0.419 4.675 94.491 
Chongqing   114.243 0.871 0.669 3.923 89.407 
Hunan   72.373 0.845 0.547 4.977 88.986 
Qinghai   137.415 1.103 1.286 1.994 86.864 
Ningxia 146.000 0.936 0.864 3.228 84.749 
Shaanxi   124.563 0.753 0.658 2.773 83.832 
Jiangxi   82.886 0.811 0.541 4.665 79.278 
Sichuan   98.787 0.828 0.662 6.000 77.961 
Anhui   80.602 0.862 0.463 4.487 76.455 
Tibet   74.311 0.482 0.756 0.078 75.786 
Guangxi 79.588 0.760 0.876 4.457 73.924 
Yunan 109.234 0.792 0.686 4.452 68.579 
Gansu   115.804 0.805 0.662 2.716 62.878 
Guizhou   115.911 0.932 1.132 6.228 44.146 
Western region average 101.687 0.840 0.657 4.076 91.207 
Note: (a) The data are mean values covering period of 1998-2008. (b) Data source include various issues 
of Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking and China Statistics Yearbooks. (c) “Eastern region” refers to 
the 11 coastal provinces and capital Beijing, while “Western region” refers to the rest of China, i.e. the 
other 20 inland provinces. (d) FD1: loans/GDP; FD2: loans/deposits; FD3: long loans/short loans; FD4: 
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Domestic loans for fixed asset investment / fiscal budget financed fixed asset investment. 
Industry SOE Presence 
 
Table 4.4 Ownership Composition across Industries 
(Measured by Output %) 
Code Name SOEs Foreign-invested 
enterprises 
Domestic private 
enterprises
13 food processing 2.4 27.8  69.8 
14 food 5.0 38.5  56.5 
15 beverage 7.3 37.2  55.5 
16 tobacco 94.4 0.3  5.3 
17 textile 2.3 24.5  73.2 
18 garments 1.1 45.0  53.9 
19 leather 0.4 52.8  46.8 
20 wood 4.2 21.1  74.7 
21 furniture 0.4 51.0  48.6 
22 papermaking 3.0 35.2  61.9 
23 printing 11.4 31.8  56.7 
24 culture & sport goods 0.6 61.2  38.3 
25 petroleum 13.9 10.9  75.3 
26 chemical materials 8.9 26.6  64.5 
27 pharmaceutical 6.6 25.3  68.1 
28 chemical fibers 7.4 29.3  63.3 
29 rubber 7.1 36.6  56.3 
30 plastic 1.7 41.3  57.0 
31 non-metal mineral products 3.6 18.3  78.1 
32 ferrous metals 23.7 14.4  61.9 
33 nonferrous metals 15.5 16.2  68.3 
34 metal products 3.0 34.9  62.1 
35 general equipments 8.2 27.3  64.5 
36 special equipments 13.9 26.1  60.0 
37 transport equipments 13.5 46.1  40.4 
39 electric machinery 3.2 37.6  59.2 
40 electronic equipments 2.6 82.1  15.3 
41 instruments 4.0 65.0  31.0 
42 art work 3.1 41.2  55.7 
43 recycling 0.6 30.5  68.9 
All average 9.1 34.5 56.4
Note: The data for average output share are actually calculated for each of the 580 four-digit industries for 
1998-2008. Aggregated data of the 30 two-digit industries only are reported here for brevity. 
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Table 4.4 reports the SOE share for different industries. The industries, including 
tobacco, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, petroleum, are with highest SOE presence; 
Whereas leather, furniture, recycling, culture and sports goods are with the lowest. 
 
Financial Development and Exporter Survival 
 
Figure 4.2 Financial Development and Export Firm Survival 
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Note: Observations are dichotomized into low and high FD groups by their mean values. 
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Figure 4.2 intuitively illustrates the impacts of four financial development 
indicators on manufacturing exporter survivals. We can see that larger scale of bank 
loans (high FD1), higher banking sector efficiency  (high FD2) and more domestic 
loan substitution for state budget and less state intervention (high FD4) are 
accompanied with higher exporter survival, while a higher ratio of medium and long 
term loans (high FD3) is negatively associated with manufacturing firms survival in 
exporting market.  
The relationship of FD3 and manufacturing exporter survival suggests that 
although better availability of long term loans could benefit business operation through 
reducing the maturity mismatch of financing and investment, it might also have 
negative effect in China where a large variation exists across types of firms and 
industries in access to long term loans. Firstly, excess access to long term finance in 
certain industries could result in overinvestment and overcapacity (Myers, 1977; 
European Chamber, 2009; D’Mello and Miranda, 2010). Secondly, strong state 
intervention will guide a high portion of long term loans into limited industries, which 
restricts the ability of firms in more privatized and competitive industries to obtain 
external finance. Taking manufacturing as an example, based on the NBS firm data, we 
calculate that 95.0% firms had short-term liabilities and 51.5% firms had long-term 
liabilities in 1998. While the share of firms with short-term liabilities increased to 
97.6%, the figure of long-term ones rapidly declined to 28.7% in 2008. Similarly, 
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among exporters, 46.6% have long-term liabilities in 1998 while this figure dropped to 
23.5% in 2008, suggesting both general firms and exporters found it more difficult to 
get long term bank loans. This fact, coupled with the increasing long over short term 
loan ratio, implies that more and more long term loans are directed to 
non-manufacturing sectors. Hence the financial development indicated as increasing 
FD3 has been actually crowding out exporters in the recent years in China. 
Table 4.5 reports the mean value of the firm-level control variables in our 
regression, for the full sample and breakdown by ownership and by region. SOEs are 
larger, more leveraged, less profitable and less export-oriented compared to their private 
and foreign counterparts. The exceptionally high age of SOEs indicates their long 
heritage in Chinese economy. Foreign invested firms have the higher export intensity, 
consistent with their OEM trading pattern.  
Table 4.5 Mean Value of Firm-level Control Variables 
 
Breakdown by ownership Breakdown by region
Variable All firms 
SOE Foreign Private East West
Age 8.704 28.214 7.174 9.054 8.348 10.296
Size 10.108 11.751 10.354 9.791 10.061 10.317
Leverage 0.566 0.751 0.517 0.602 0.57 0.547
Profitability 0.014 -0.31 0.012 0.034 0.019 -0.008
Export intensity 0.597 0.284 0.683 0.534 0.623 0.480
The correlation coefficients of the main regressors are listed in Table 4.6. The 
correlation coefficients between control variables are lower than 0.45, indicating a low 
risk of multicollinearity. SOE Pre is constructed based on four-digit industry-level data, 
and has a low correlation with FDs which are calculated based on province-level data. 
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The interaction terms of FDs with SOE Pre, i.e. FD* SOE Pre also has very low 
correlation with FDs or SOE Pre, with absolute values all lower than 0.10. Due to space 
limitation, these coefficients are not reported here.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
1. Age 1.000  
2. Size 0.234 1.000  
3. Leverage 0.090 0.003 1.000  
4. Profitability -0.071 -0.018 -0.116 1.000  
5. Export intensity -0.154 -0.268 -0.009 0.018 1.000  
6. K/L*CapInt -0.016 0.076 -0.026 0.014 -0.043  1.000 
7. H/L*HumInt -0.007 0.067 -0.017 0.004 -0.063  0.428 1.000 
8. FD1 -0.035 0.011 0.042 -0.012 0.050  0.035 0.196 1.000 
9. FD2 0.020 -0.079 0.048 -0.027 0.007  -0.064 -0.096 0.115 1.000 
10. FD3 -0.064 0.107 -0.082 0.035 -0.014  0.037 0.112 0.052 -0.591 1.000 
11. FD4 -0.038 0.023 0.027 0.014 0.021  0.077 0.132 0.263 -0.166 0.193 1.000 
12. SOE Pre 0.166 0.226 0.030 -0.023 -0.251 0.012 0.004 -0.046 0.034 -0.039 -0.059
Table 4.6 Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
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4.4 Empirical Results  
 
4.4.1 Financial Development and Exporter Survival: Baseline Results 
Table 4.7 reports baseline regression results of equation 4.1. We first regress 
exporter hazard rate on FD1 to FD4 respectively, then add interaction term of FDs 
with industry SOE presence to accounting for the heterogeneous effect on different 
industries. Consistent with the pattern observed in Figure 4.2, the coefficients of FD1, 
FD2 and FD4 are negative and statistically significant at 1% level, which suggests that 
financial development in China, either increasing provision of bank loans, 
improvement of banking sector efficiency or reduction of government intervention in 
financial resources allocation, favors Chinese exporter survival in foreign market. In 
contrast, the coefficient of FD3 is significantly positive, revealing that the relatively 
faster growing issuance of long term loans negatively affects exporter survival. This 
result confirms our conjecture that the increasing long term loan issuance and its 
concentration in few industries squeeze the financial resources in manufacturing and 
exacerbate exporter survival.   
 
Table 4.7 Baseline Models with Four Alternative Definitions of Financial Development 
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Note: (a) Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to one if the firm fails, and zero otherwise. (b) Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. (c) *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. (d) SOE Pre is the output 
share of SOEs in each 4-digit industry. Robustness checks are performed using total assets and 
employment of SOEs as alternative measurement. Highly consistent results are obtained. (e) Further 
controlling SOE Pre as an individual variable generates qualitatively similar results for FDs and 
FDs*SOE Pre, which are available upon request. (f) Dummy variables for provinces, industries and years 
are included in all models. 
 
When we further include the interaction terms of FDs with SOE presence, the 
coefficients of FDs change little. The negative signs of interaction terms with FD1 and 
FD2 suggest that the benefit from financial development is intensified in those 
industries with higher SOE presence. As we discussed above, due to the crowding out 
effect of SOEs, other non-state firms in these industries are more financially constrained 
and thus more sensitive to the improvement of external financing conditions. The same 
logic applies to FD3, as the adverse impact of discriminatively granted long term loans 
to non-manufacturing industries is reinforced by SOE presence. A different result 
emerges for FD4. The interaction term has a sign opposite to that of FD4 as an 
individual variable, which implies that the advantage of weakening government 
intervention is partly offset by the presence of SOEs. 
In each of the 8 models, we include firm level determinants on survival and 
additional controls accounting for other sources of comparative advantage. The results 
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suggest that export hazard rate first increases and then decreases with firm age. The 
survival rate increases with firm size, which duplicates the pattern predicted by 
theoretical papers, e.g. Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). As predicted, a high leverage 
ratio may put a firm in jeopardy while profitable firms can have a lower failure rate. 
Moreover, a firm with relatively high export intensity tends to have a lower failure rate, 
indicating the importance of international exposure. As for the role of endowment 
abundance, physical capital (K/L*CapInt) shows no impact. Nonetheless H/L*HumInt is 
unfavourable to exporters’ survival. We interpret that high HumInt, measured by 
average wage rate, not only indicates high labor quality, but also is associated with high 
cost structure of exporters. Taking into consideration of the fact that more than half of 
recent Chinese export has been in the assembly trade, the positive sign of H/L*HumInt 
implies that the comparative advantage of Chinese exporters largely lies in labor cost 
advantage rather than labor quality. 
 
4.4.2 The Differentiated Effect of Financial Development across Ownership 
To further test our hypothesis on financial distortion among ownerships, we break 
down the whole sample into three ownerships, namely domestic private enterprises, 
SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises. The new results are reported in Panels (a), (b) 
and (c) of Table 4.8, respectively.
Table 4.8 Sub-sample by Ownership  (a) Domestic Private Enterprises 
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Table 4.8 Sub-sample by Ownership  (b) SOEs 
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Table 4.8 Sub-sample by Ownership  (c) Foreign-invested Enterprises 
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In the regressions for domestic private enterprises we discover results highly 
similar to those obtained in the full sample models. All coefficients of FDs are as 
expected and significant except for FD3, which implies that for private enterprises, the 
benefit of financial development are prominent in providing better access to bank loans 
and lessening ownership discrimination and government direct intervention while the 
term structure of loans is not so important. Actually in the eastern provinces that host 
more than 90% exporters of China, firms’ business operations are heavily dependent on 
short term debts from informal sectors due to bad availability of bank loans (Allen et al., 
2005). The high significance of FD1, FD2 and FD4 reflects the severity of financial 
constraint for domestic private firms as a result of financial discrimination, which is 
consistent with the negative sign (although not significant) of leverage, in contrast to 
positive ones for other types of firms. For SOEs and foreign invested firms, higher 
leverage indicates financial vulnerability and risks, which leads to higher firm failure 
risks. For private firms whose debt level is constrained by poor external financing 
conditions, higher leverage implies stronger social capitals and better exploitation of 
financing leverage to fund firm investment and growth (Ge and Qiu, 2007), and 
therefore, can be favorable for survival. 
Compared to private enterprises, the SOEs and foreign firms have relatively more 
financial resources from the state, and overseas headquarters or investors respectively, 
they are therefore less financially constrained and perceive little marginal benefit from 
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domestic financial development. This finding is consistent with Poncet et al. (2010) and 
Guariglia et al. (2011) who show private Chinese firms are financially constrained while 
SOEs and foreign firms are not. As for the SOEs, only the scale of loans, FD1, has a 
modest mitigating effect on their export hazard. Differing from private and foreign firms, 
the sign of FD4 for SOEs, though insignificant, changes to positive, which suggests that 
SOEs lose from weakened government intervention, but this loss is partly remedied in 
industries with more SOE presence when we use employment as an alternative measure 
of SOE presence in industries. 
For foreign invested firms, FD2 measuring banking efficiency also has an 
alleviating effect. Furthermore, the sign of FD3 is negative comparing to the positive 
sign for private firms, which suggests that foreign invested firms could benefit from 
growing long term loans through, for example, better infrastructure. Interestingly, 
foreign firms significantly benefit from weaker government intervention even though 
this effect is partly offset by the presence of SOEs. Considering the facts that foreign 
firms are relatively abundant in growth funds and they are not competing directly with 
SOEs for domestic financial resources, this extra adverse effect of SOE presence is 
probably caused by non-financial factors, i.e. the limited market access during the 
sample period. Table 4.9 summarizes how the Chinese government’s attitude toward 
foreign investment has evolved after 1995. The share of restricted and prohibited 
industries dropped from 42.9% in 1997 to 29.0% in 2002 after China’s WTO accession, 
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and since then that share has barely declined any further. The SOE presence in our 
regression actually proxies the protection level of market access, therefore, higher SOE 
presence worsens foreign firms survival. In stark comparison to SOE and private firms, 
the result of H/L*HumInt for foreign firms is universally significant in all 8 models. 
This contrast, together with the previously discussed fact that 77% export businesses of 
foreign-invested enterprises are OEM exporting, clearly indicates that foreign-invested 
firms take China as production base and export platform and they are highly sensitive to 
wage cost adjustment. 
Table 4.9 Three Types of Market Access Stated by the FDI Directory of China 
 
Encouraged industries Restricted industries Prohibited industries 
Version 
Number % Number % Number % 
1995 172 53.9 116 36.4 31 9.7 
1997 186 57.1 112 34.4 28 8.6 
2002 262 71.0 75 20.3 32 8.7 
2004 257 70.2 76 20.8 33 9.0 
2007 351 73.4 87 18.2 40 8.4 
Note: counted and calculated by authors based on the various versions of FDI Directory of China. 
 
4.4.3 The Distinct Roles of Financial Development across Regions 
Considering the different levels of financial development and evolution patterns in 
the eastern and the western region shown by Figure 4.1, we also compare the effects of 
financial development between regions (see Table 4.10). As the exporters located in the 
eastern provinces account for 80% of firm number and 90% of export value of all 
exporters in our full sample, it is not surprising that the results for the eastern region are 
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highly consistent with those for the whole country reported in Table 4.7. However, 
distinction does arise for the western region. The signs of FDs in the western region are 
completely opposite to those in the eastern region except for FD1. The coefficient of 
FD1 in the western region is much higher and more significant than the eastern region, 
which manifests the relative lack of funds in the western region of China. Contrary to 
the eastern region, the sign of FD2 is positive for the western region. This implies a 
higher FD2, associated with more financial resources allocated by government into the 
western region, is unfavorable for exporter survival probably due to lower efficiency of 
government-led lendings compared with market driven ones. This contrast is consistent 
with the disparity of average bank NPL ratios between the western (3.25%) and eastern 
regions (2.19%)8. Nevertheless, the manufacturing exporters in the western region can 
benefit from more long term loan issuing (FD3). According to our earlier discussion, the 
negative sign of FD3 suggests a spillover effect of investment in state dominant 
non-manufacturing industries to manufacturing exporters instead of the crowding out 
effect observed in the eastern provinces. Finally, the result of FD4 indicates, 
government budget in financing fixed asset investment, although inefficient, still plays a 
positive role for exporter survival in the western region, which should not be simply 
substituted by domestic private loans.  
 
8 Calculated with data from the 2008 Annual Report of China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
Table 4.10 Sub-sample by Region  (a) Eastern Provinces 
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Table 4.10 Sub-sample by Region  (b) Western Provinces 
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In addition, the results of the interaction terms of FD1 and FD4 with SOE Pre 
reveal that due to political connection and priority in obtaining finance of SOEs, 
industries with higher SOE presence gain more from financial development in the 
western region. The mitigating effect of FD2*SOE Pre implies that even though 
government funding easily neglects profitability and induces to efficiency loss, its bias 
towards SOEs benefit those industries where SOEs prevail considering the all-round 
lack of funds in the western region. In contrast, the advantages of long term loan 
issuance FD3 are partly offset in industries with high SOE presence, which we interpret 
as a result of capital misuse due to excessive abundance of long term loans in these 
industries. 
The results for cross-region comparison further clarify the mechanism of 
distortional lending on exporter survival and have clear regional policy implications. In 
the eastern provinces where private and foreign invested exporters dominate the 
regional export (98.1% in terms of number of all exporters in the NBS sample we use), 
elimination of ownership discrimination, reduction of government intervention and 
increase of banking sector efficiency should be in the priority of policy makers. It 
includes, for example, relaxing market access restrictions on credit cooperatives, trust 
and investment companies, and foreign banks to diversity banking industry, intensifying 
bank competition and operation in a more marketized way, speeding up developing 
legal institutions such as investor protection, information disclosure, to reduce 
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information asymmetry and agency cost etc. While in the economically and 
institutionally lagged western region, exporters are suppressed by the widespread lack 
of finance, the government is indispensable in funding investment and supplying public 
services, including financial infrastructures.   
 
4.5  Conclusion  
 
This research investigates the role of financial development in fostering trade by 
addressing firstly its impact on exporter survival in foreign market. We explore 
evidences on the relationship between financial development and exporter survival 
using detailed Chinese firm level data. We ask, firstly if the financial development as a 
result of financial system reform in China facilitates its exporter survival, and 
furthermore, if such facilitation is biased by distortional lending across industries and 
different types of firms as a result of prevailing government intervention in financial 
resources allocation.  
We find that financial development, featured by bank loan expansion, lending 
efficiency improvement and government withdrawal, helps promote exporter survival in 
foreign market. However, the relatively more issuance of long term loans decreases firm 
survival due to their excessive concentration on a small scope of non-tradable industries. 
We further show that the effect of financial development differs across the types of 
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firms. Private firms gain most from reduction of state interference and better 
accessibility to external finance. Similarly, weakened government intervention is of 
great importance for foreign invested enterprises. However, financial development has 
no significant influence on SOEs as they already have a political advantage of access to 
bank loans. In addition, the impact of financial development on exporters’ survival 
could be biased with the presence of state capital in an industry and varies across 
regions. Although the existence of government exacerbates lending distortion and 
consequently worsens exporter survival, its participation through filling the capital gap 
and providing public services in economically lagged regions is nonetheless admirable. 
Our results provide strong evidence on the positive effect of financial development 
on trade through supporting exporter survival. Moreover, they suggest the importance of 
ownership, as a new dimension of firm heterogeneity, in affecting firm financing 
capability and consequent trade performance in a country with underdeveloped financial 
system. Meanwhile, the contrastive effect of financial development across regions 
implies the role of government in external finance expansion through either funding 
investment directly or acting as an implicit credit guarantor, which is of particular 
significance in those countries with less developed financial sectors and low quality of 
financial and legal institutions. Admittedly, excessive government participation in 
financial resource allocation could result in financial distortion and inefficiency. To 
conclude, our research suggests besides relying on traditional comparative advantage in 
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cost of labor and raw materials, transition economies need to strategically consider 
promoting trade through developing domestic financial system and optimizing financial 
resources allocation.  
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